Yeshiva University, Cardozo School of Law

LARC @ Cardozo Law
Articles
2020

Congressional Administration of Foreign Affairs
Rebecca Ingber

Follow this and additional works at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles
Part of the Law Commons

Faculty

COPYRIGHT © 2020 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

CONGRESSIONAL ADMINISTRATION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Rebecca Ingber*
Longstanding debates over the allocation of foreign affairs power
between Congress and the President have reached a stalemate.
Wherever the formal line between Congress and the President’s powers
is drawn, it is well established that, as a functional matter, even in times
of great discord between the two branches, the President wields
immense power when he acts in the name of foreign policy or national
security.
And yet, while scholarship focuses on the accretion of power in the
presidency, presidential primacy is not the end of the story. The fact
that the President usually “wins” in foreign affairs does not mean that
the position the President ultimately chooses to take is preordained.
Questions of foreign policy and national security engage diverse
components of the executive branch bureaucracy, which have
overlapping jurisdictions and often conflicting biases and priorities.
And yet they must arrive at one executive branch position. Thus the
process of decision making, the weight accorded the position of any
given decision maker, and the context in which the decision is made
together shape the ultimate position the President takes.
This Article explores and critiques the foreign policy role Congress
can—and does—play in structuring and rearranging the relative
powers of those internal actors and the processes they take to reach
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their decisions, in order to influence and even direct the President’s
ultimate position. Having yielded much of the ground on substance,
Congress has an opportunity for a second bite at the apple, and may
influence the policy directions of the presidency by manipulating its
internal workings. There are risks to deploying “process controls,” as
I term these measures, in lieu of direct substantive engagement, but I
argue that Congress can and should use these tools more instrumentally
to influence the course of foreign policy in areas where it is otherwise
unlikely to assert itself as a coequal branch and necessary check on
presidential power.
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INTRODUCTION
Longstanding debates over the allocation of foreign affairs power
between Congress and the President have reached a stalemate. Wherever
the line between Congress and the President’s formal authority is drawn,
it is well established that, as a functional matter, even in times of great
discord between the two branches, the President wields immense power
when he acts in the name of foreign policy or national security.
But presidential primacy is not the end of the story. While the President
might wield far-reaching control over the nation’s foreign affairs and
national security policies, Congress can shape the President’s position,
and thus the foreign policy of the United States, without necessarily
mandating the substance of that policy itself.
This Article explores and critiques the foreign policy role Congress
can—and does—play through structuring and rearranging the relative
powers of internal executive branch actors and the processes they take to
reach their decisions, in order to influence and even direct the President’s
ultimate position. Having yielded much of the ground on substance,
Congress has an opportunity for a second bite at the apple, and may
influence the policy directions of the presidency simply by manipulating
its internal workings.
A recent example illustrates the point. In 2017, the newly elected
President threatened a trade war with China, Mexico, Canada and other
longtime allies and competitors around the globe, proposing high tariffs
on imports of steel and specific products, such as foreign-made vehicles.1
His own political party controlled the House and Senate, but there was
little appetite in Congress for raising tariffs. So he turned inward, looking

The President’s 2017 Trade Policy Agenda, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
(2017), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2017/AnnualReport/Chapter%20I%20-%20The%20President%27s%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda.pdf [https://perma.cc/GV4T6289]; Bob Bryan & Elena Holodny, Trump’s Considering a Tariff That Could Put the
Economy on a Path to ‘Global Recession,’ Business Insider (June 30, 2017, 10:24 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-steel-tariff-china-germany-japan-global-recession2017-6 [https://perma.cc/S2QY-YNL8]; Peter S. Goodman, Trump’s Trade War May Have
Already Begun, N.Y. Times (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/business/economy/trumps-mexico-china-tariff-trade.html [https://perma.cc/M5WH-PMVR].
1
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to his own cabinet to effectuate his plans. Government lawyers dusted off
a rarely-used delegation from Congress, Section 232 of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962, which permits the President to adjust restrictions
on imports when the Secretary of Commerce finds that they impose a
threat to national security.2
With his statutory authority contingent upon meeting this procedural
requirement, the President demanded that the Commerce Secretary
consider the effects on national security of steel and aluminum imports,
asserting meanwhile, in an expansive interpretation of this statutory
exception, that the nation’s economic welfare is itself a matter of national
security.3 The Secretary of Commerce, following the statute’s
requirements, consulted with the Secretary of Defense, who told him, in
a diplomatically-worded missive, that the adjustments proposed by
Commerce were in fact unnecessary for national security, and could have
negative consequences for U.S. relationships with important allies.4
Those steps taken, and despite the Defense Secretary’s warning, the
President moved ahead on the Commerce Secretary’s report, imposing
additional tariffs on both steel and aluminum imports.5
Members of the President’s own party in Congress issued unusual
rebukes of the President’s action, denouncing the measures as a “tax hike
on American manufacturers, workers and consumers,”6 asking the

2

19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)–(c) (2012). Prior to the Trump Presidency, presidential authority to
impose tariffs had only been exercised a total of five times across the authority’s sixty-fouryear existence that began with a temporary authorization in 1955. Rachel F. Fefer et al., Cong.
Research Serv., R45249, Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress app.
b, at 35 (2018).
3
Memorandum on Aluminum Imports and Threats to National Security, 2017 Daily Comp.
Pres. Doc. 284 (Apr. 27, 2017); Memorandum on Steel Imports and Threats to National
Security, 2017 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 259 (Apr. 20, 2017).
4 Letter from James N. Mattis, Sec’y of Def., to Wilbur L. Ross Jr., Sec’y of Commerce
(2018), https://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/department_of_defense_memo_response_to_steel_and_aluminum_policy_recommendations.pdf [https://perma.cc/HA7Y-UWL6]
[hereinafter Letter from Mattis to Ross] (“As noted in both Section 232 reports, however, the
U.S. military requirements for steel and aluminum each only represent about three percent of
U.S. production. Therefore, DoD does not believe that the findings in the reports impact the
ability of DoD programs to acquire the steel or aluminum necessary to meet national defense
requirements.”).
5 Fefer et al., supra note 2, at 7. The President also negotiated exceptions on a country-bycountry basis. Id. at 7–9.
6 Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., Hatch Statement on Steel, Aluminum Tariffs
(Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/hatch-statement-on-steel-aluminum-tariffs [https://perma.cc/42YF-KMX8].
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President to dial back the global tariffs,7 and most recently passing
legislation mandating a report from the Secretary of Commerce.8
Congress did not, however, exercise its power to withdraw the President’s
authority to adjust imports, an authority that Congress itself had given to
the President through increasingly expansive delegations since the
1930s.9
Yet congressional reticence to reassert dominance over trade policy is
not the end of the story. There is another tool of control that members of
Congress might deploy and which, despite increasingly relinquishing
power to the President, Congress has used several times before in order
to influence the direction of U.S. trade policy. And that is to restructure
the decision-making process inside the executive branch in order to
preference decision makers and processes more likely to favor their
preferred outcomes.
Indeed, members of Congress have introduced several bills seeking to
do just that. In 2018 and 2019, several bipartisan groups of lawmakers
introduced bills in both the House and Senate to retract from the Secretary
of Commerce the power to invoke a national security justification for
raising tariffs on foreign imports.10 The bills would grant that power
instead to the Secretary of Defense—the very cabinet secretary who had,
as the bill proponents surely noticed, criticized the Commerce Secretary’s
proposed indiscriminate tariffs.11 Such micro-management over the
7 Vicki Needham, Ways and Means Sets Hearing on Trump’s Tariffs, The Hill (Apr. 5, 2018,

5:17 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/381875-ways-and-means-set-hearing-on-trumps-tariffs [https://perma.cc/AN9E-98LU].
8 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-93, § 112, 133 Stat. 2317, 2395–
96 (2019) (requiring publication of the Secretary of Commerce’s findings in automobiles and
automotive parts market within thirty days of enactment). The Administration has thus far
resisted complying with this provision. See Steven A. Engel, Office of Legal Counsel,
Publication of a Report to the President on the Effect of Automobile and Automobile-Part
Imports on the National Security 1–2 (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/olc/opinion/file/1236426/download [https://perma.cc/YYC3-AHW6] (arguing that President may
assert executive privilege over Secretary of Commerce’s automobile and automobile parts
report).
9 See infra Subsection II.C.1 (detailing historical development of the national security
justification for imposing tariffs).
10 Trade Security Act of 2019, S. 365, 116th Cong. (2019); Bicameral Congressional Trade
Authority Act of 2019, S. 287, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 6923, 115th Cong. § 4 (2018); S.
3329, 115th Cong. § 2 (2018).
11 See Letter from Mattis to Ross, supra note 4. Former Defense Secretary Mattis resigned
between the 2018 and 2019 bill proposals, but press releases accompanying the 2019
proposals, such as one stating the purpose was to counter “misuse” of the national security
justification and “to ensure that the statute is used for genuine national security purposes,”
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executive branch decision maker is not an untested tool for Congress. In
fact, the bills would make the Office of the Defense Secretary at least the
sixth distinct congressionally designated executive branch office to wield
that authority since Congress began delegating away its power over the
nation’s trade policy.12
Why might members of Congress who want to challenge the
President’s trade policies deploy an indirect tool of micro-management
over the executive branch’s decision-making process, rather than simply
direct the policy themselves through substantive legislation? And could
such an indirect tool have any real effect?
In fact, indirect tools such as the choice of executive branch decision
maker or the restructuring of internal decision-making processes can
entirely redirect the President’s policy outcomes, and members of
Congress often have reason to prefer these mechanisms to more direct
legislation. Thus, while Congress may defer or even delegate to the
President on matters of substantive foreign policy—and while members
of Congress may not rest assured that the President will implement their
will even when they do mandate substance—Congress may nevertheless
shape the nation’s foreign policy through what I term “congressional
administration.”13

suggest that bill proponents view the Defense Department’s constraining effect on the use of
the national security justification as departmental rather than unique to Mattis. See Press
Release, Sen. Rob Portman, Portman, Jones, Ernst, Alexander, Feinstein, Fischer, Sinema &
Young Introduce Trade Security Act to Reform National Security Tariff Process (Feb. 6,
2019), https://www.portman.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/portman-jones-ernst-alexander-feinstein-fischer-sinema-young-introduce [https://perma.cc/4DQZ-AVE4] [hereinafter
Press Release, Sen. Rob Portman].
12 See generally Edward E. Groves, A Brief History of the 1988 National Security
Amendments, 20 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 589, 590–93 (1989) (detailing the ways in which
Congress has empowered other agencies to conduct trade policy). The executive agents who
have been tasked with fulfilling the requirements of Section 232 include: Director of Defense
Mobilization (1955), Director of the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization (1958),
Director of the Office of Emergency Planning (1962), Director of the Office of Emergency
Preparedness (1968), Secretary of the Treasury (1974), and Secretary of Commerce (1979).
Id.
13 I use this term as a congressional corollary to then-Professor Elena Kagan’s “Presidential
Administration,” which she identified as presidential control of the bureaucracy as a means to
advance “the President's own policy and political agenda,” particularly in the face of political
obstacles to doing so through other means. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114
Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2248 (2001). Professor Jack Beermann uses this term directly, to describe
Congress’s ongoing involvement in the “day to day administration of the law.” Jack M.
Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 61, 64 (2006).
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Congressional administration, as I define it here, is the management
and manipulation of internal executive branch decision-making processes
for the purpose of advancing a substantive agenda. Congress has an array
of measures that it may deploy to influence the nation’s foreign policy,
short of mandating the substance itself. These “process controls” include
familiar tools such as agency design and procedural requirements, but
they also include the designation and reassignment of decision makers
within the executive branch. Each of these may be deployed for different
purposes, with different effects and risks, and each may have significant
effects on the ultimate policy direction the United States takes.
This Article sits at the intersection of two broad bodies of literature:
one on congressional-executive turf wars over foreign affairs and national
security, and one on agency design and political control over the
bureaucracy. Scholars have long debated the proper constitutional
allocation of power between the President and Congress over the direction
of the nation’s foreign policy. As a practical matter, however, the
conventional wisdom holds that “the President (almost) always wins in
foreign affairs.”14 The reasons for presidential primacy are legion:
institutional competence; asymmetrical expertise and information; and
more costs than benefits to Congress in engaging. Moreover, many argue
that even when Congress does engage directly and substantively on a
matter, the President often manages to assert authority to act, either by
interpreting his statutory authorities broadly,15 or by claiming a
constitutional prerogative to act unilaterally,16 or even by skirting the
legal constraints altogether.17
But the fact that the President usually “wins” vis-à-vis Congress does
not mean that the position the President ultimately chooses to take is
14 Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs:
Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 Yale L.J. 1255, 1291 (1988); see also Aaron Wildavsky,
The Two Presidencies, 4 Trans-Action 7 (1966) (arguing that presidents typically receive
support or, at least, a lack of pushback from Congress on their foreign policy agenda).
15 See Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th
Cong. 7–11 (2011) (statement of Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dept. of State); see also
Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1095 (2009)
(arguing that administrative law is sufficiently vague to enable Presidents to act without
constraint at the invocation of an emergency, and that this is inevitable).
16 See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2086 (2015).
17 For a bit of all three, see Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Exec. Office of the
President (Aug. 1, 2002), https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/886061/download [https://perma.cc/AM56-F4TD].

COPYRIGHT © 2020 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

402

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 106:395

preordained. Nor does it mean that the policy the President ultimately
adopts at the end of what is often a long and contentious decision-making
process is the one he would have chosen if all possible options were
simply laid out before him at the outset. In fact, presidential primacy does
not even mean that the policy the President ultimately adopts has actually
received the personal sign-off of the President.
Indeed there is another dynamic beyond that of the President-Congress
relationship that is essential to understanding foreign policy positioning
and is as much of a hotbed for diversity of opinion. This is the multifaceted, many-headed organism that is the executive branch bureaucracy.
That there is a diversity of opinion within the executive branch, especially
on matters of foreign policy and national security, should be clear these
days to anyone who picks up a newspaper.18 That the process for decision
making inside the executive branch influences the resulting policies is
perhaps less intuitive, particularly to those who envision a unitary
executive headed by a willful President with his fingers in every pot. And
yet it is so. Furthermore, there exist opportunities for influencing these
processes, and thus the resulting policy, from the outside. Of specific
relevance here, Congress has robust means at its disposal to shape these
processes and thus the resulting decision.
I have written previously about the multiplicity of decision makers,
processes, overlapping interests, and conflicting proclivities inside the
executive branch, and the potential for external actors to shape the
President’s positions by triggering different decision-making pathways.19
I focused in prior work on the role of litigants, nongovernmental
organizations, and international treaty bodies in prompting different
processes and the potential for achieving different outcomes.20 But
members of Congress have far greater opportunities than most for
triggering and even for restructuring different decision-making pathways,
including for designating their preferred internal official as the decider
over a given matter.
While executive branch decision making may at times appear opaque
from the outside—particularly in the realm of foreign policy and national
security—savvy government watchers, scholars, and even members of
Congress can often glean a sense of its inner workings: which matters are
18

Or, if this is anachronistic, then to anyone who is on Twitter.
Rebecca Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts and Executive Branch Legal Decisionmaking,
38 Yale J. Int’l L. 359, 369–73 (2013) [hereinafter Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts].
20 Id.
19
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subject to internal debate, who within the administration may be inclined
toward particular policies, and where the pressure points lie for decision
making.21 Actors inclined to lean into these pressure points may therefore
find they can influence policy outcomes simply by exerting influence on
the shape of executive branch decision making.
Members of Congress have especially potent tools for shaping the
process of decision making, through legislation directly creating
procedural requirements or designating decision makers, as well as
through “soft” mechanisms such as requests for testimony from particular
executive branch officials,22 all of which can shape and shift presidential
priorities, force to a head executive branch decisions, exacerbate internal
tensions, or place a thumb on the scale in favor of a particular set of actors
engaged in intra-executive branch conflict. Through the use of these
process controls, Congress can and does shape the process of executive
branch decision making and influence policy without necessarily
mandating a particular substantive outcome.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I first considers scholarly debates
over the legal and practical allocation of the foreign affairs power,
including the extent to which Congress is able effectively to constrain the
President in this sphere. Acknowledging the practical reality of
presidential primacy in matters of foreign affairs, it turns to scholarship
considering the interaction of Congress with the internal workings of the
executive branch bureaucracy. This scholarship largely brackets off the
fields of foreign policy and national security, thus bringing insights from
administrative law and political science scholarship on political control
of the bureaucracy to bear on debates about the allocation of foreign
policy power is one contribution of this Article.
Part II introduces and classifies what I term “process controls,” the
mechanisms that Congress may deploy to influence the executive branch
decision-making process, and through it, the shape of foreign policy. Two
types of measures that I include within the term process controls—agency
design and the imposition of administrative procedures—have been the
21 In fact, members of Congress often have significant ties to the executive branch both
through their own personal relationship to members of the political class within the
administration and through staffers’ often deep connections to agencies through prior
positions, former colleagues, and the fact that they are repeat players on specific issues. See,
e.g., Ashley Deeks, Statutory International Law, 57 Va. J. Int’l L. 263, 296–97 (2018).
22 See Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution: Legislative Authority and the Separation of
Powers 3 (2017) (arguing that Congress has many tools, including both “hard” like
appropriations and “soft” like speech, which it underutilizes).
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subject of significant scholarship in both administrative law and political
science.23 I therefore consider these each in turn in order to examine their
relevance and influence on questions of foreign policy and national
security, which are generally excluded from scholarship concerning
agency design and administrative procedure.
I devote the majority of this Part, and of the Article, to identifying and
analyzing a specific type of process control that has not been the focus of
scholarship: the designation of executive branch decision makers. Among
the controls I discuss in this Article, Congress wields significant, targeted
control over decision making inside the executive branch simply through
its choice of the intra-executive decider. This is not a one-off decision;
Congress may—and does—reassign the decision maker as new events
arise or policy preferences shift. Members of Congress thus may seek to
shift a delegation of authority horizontally, from one executive branch
official or office to another who may espouse policy preferences more in
sync with their own. Or they may allocate power vertically, such as
upward toward a high-level official if they are looking to increase political
accountability for a decision, or downward to professionals and
technocrats when seeking to buffer an issue from partisan politics. Or they
may try to diffuse power, perhaps as a means of constraining government
action, by requiring consultation among or even certification by several
different officials.
Part III considers the implications of Congress turning to process
controls to shape foreign policy. It considers when and why Congress
might turn to process controls over more direct efforts to mandate
substance, and which particular process controls are likely to be effective
at implementing particular purposes. This Part also probes the unique
constitutional questions raised by congressional administration of foreign
policy, as well as the risks at stake—risks to good government and to
accountability for decision making.
In considering the influence of internal decision makers and processes
on executive branch policy and Congress’s ability to influence its
direction through these processes, this Article also adds texture to debates
about a “unitary executive” model of executive branch decision making.
I discuss the implications of process controls for formal doctrine and the
potential for judicial review in Part III. But the influence of process
controls on policy I discuss in this paper more broadly provides a
23

See infra Part II.
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functional critique of unitary executive theory. Wherever the line
ultimately falls on the formal powers of the President over those within
the executive branch, the multiplicity of decision makers and processes
will always provide practical opportunities for influencing and even
manipulating executive branch policies, from within the executive branch
and without.
Congress has ceded significant ground to the President on matters of
foreign policy and national security, and continues to do so, often
abdicating its responsibility to craft policy or to provide substantive,
rigorous oversight. Moreover, Congress has at times lost ground to the
President even when it has attempted to assert its prerogative.24 But this
Article nevertheless challenges views of the presidency as completely
untethered to law or to congressional constraint. Congress may be overly
timid in this space, and it may at times be ineffective. But it can and does
exercise its power to shape foreign policy short of mandating substance,
and it could deploy these process controls even more instrumentally to
impel decision making in its preferred direction. Though the focus here is
on foreign policy and national security decision making, this consideration of process controls has relevance beyond these spheres, to stillnascent questions of how Congress interacts with the levers and pulleys
effectuating decisions inside the executive branch.
I. FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER AND BUREAUCRATIC CONTROLS
This Article sits at the intersection of two broad bodies of literature:
one on congressional-executive power struggles over foreign affairs and
national security, and one on agency design and political control over the
bureaucracy.
A. Congressional-Executive Allocations of Foreign Affairs Power
It has long been conventional wisdom that the President exercises
significantly more control over foreign affairs than does Congress. As a
matter of constitutional authority, scholars continue to debate the proper
allocation of foreign affairs power between the President and Congress.25
24

See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2086 (2015).
Compare Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over
Foreign Affairs, 111 Yale L.J. 231, 233–34 (2001) (arguing that the President has significant
foreign affairs power, including a “residual” foreign affairs power within the executive
power), with Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests the Executive Power, Not the Royal
25
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And yet as a practical matter, the question quite rarely comes to a head.26
This is not for lack of possible flashpoints, but rather because Congress
rarely deploys all the power it clearly holds, let alone tries to push the
envelope. In fact, Congress has a wide range of methods at its disposal
for exercising direct authority over foreign affairs well within its
explicitly allocated authority—from committee oversight to
appropriations to declarations of war.27 Yet members of Congress have
often been reticent to use this power, for reasons both practical and
political, and Congress’s formal authority generally well exceeds its
functional willingness to deploy it. To the extent that longstanding
practice affects the balance of powers among the branches, this
acquiescence by Congress in the executive’s stranglehold on foreign
affairs may even result in a formal shift in power to the executive over
time.28
The reasons for congressional reticence to get involved in foreign
policy are overdetermined.29 Some are based in rational justifications like
institutional competence and good government. Much of the foreign
affairs and national security expertise is now housed in the executive
branch, and thus some level of deference to their more granular
knowledge may be justified.30 Exponential increases in complexity and
classification lead to significant information asymmetries between the
branches.31 And to the extent it is advantageous that the state speak with

Prerogative, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 1169, 1172–73 (2019) (arguing that the Vesting Clause is
nothing more than the “authority to carry out projects defined by a prior exercise of the
legislative power”).
26 A recent notable exception is the case of Zivotofsky v. Kerry, in which the State
Department refused to implement a statutory requirement that passports for individuals born
in Jerusalem list the place of birth as “Israel.” 135 S. Ct. at 2083. The Supreme Court heard
the case and held that the statutory requirement impermissibly infringed on the President’s
plenary power over recognition of foreign governments. Id. at 2086.
27 See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
28 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation
of Powers, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 411, 414–15 (2012) (analyzing the role of acquiesced-in
government practices in the context of separation of powers).
29 See, e.g., Wildavsky, supra note 14, at 7–14 (arguing that, among other reasons, foreign
policy engages fewer clear partisan preferences than domestic matters and requires expertise
the public does not tend to have, and thus Congress tends to cede to the President a freer hand
on such matters).
30 Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory,
29 Presidential Stud. Q. 850, 855–56 (1999).
31 Patricia M. Wald & Jonathan R. Siegel, The D.C. Circuit and the Struggle for Control of
Presidential Information, 90 Geo. L.J. 737, 737 (2002).
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“one voice” on the international plane, the President is the likeliest option
for holding that mantle.32 Some reasons are practical: collective action
takes time, and the President is considered to be at least relatively
“unitary” and thus can act with dispatch that the other branches do not
enjoy.33 Moreover, while members of Congress have many tools at their
disposal, including the power of the purse, they do not themselves
command militaries.34 But, Congress being Congress, the most significant
reason for congressional listlessness in foreign affairs is likely the
political one. Most members of Congress have likely determined that the
political costs to engaging in foreign policy are not worth the political
benefits and tend to engage in this arena only when they are.35
All of this is, of course, a matter of intense scholarly discussion and
debate. In addition to disagreement over whether Congress has abdicated
its authority over foreign affairs, and whether the President has
wrongfully aggrandized his power, scholars have also questioned the
extent to which Congress even can rein in the President when it tries to.36
Many scholars have rightly noted the difficulties Congress faces in
changing the President’s course of action in the foreign affairs and
national security spaces even when it chooses to legislate constraints.37
These concerns are compounded by other public law scholarship
questioning the extent to which the President is bound by law generally.38

32

See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution 42 (2d ed.
1996) (“That the President is the sole organ of official communication by and to the United
States has not been questioned and has not been a source of significant controversy.”); Curtis
A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control over International Law, 131 Harv. L.
Rev. 1201, 1231, 1258 (2018). But see Kristen E. Eichensehr, Courts, Congress, and the
Conduct of Foreign Relations, 85 U. Chi. L. Rev. 609, 625 (2018) (discussing the
undertheorized reality of congressional communication with foreign nations).
33 See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 28, at 438–44 (discussing structural and political
impediments to congressional action).
34 See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L.J. 1725, 1818 (1996)
(discussing the President’s longstanding unilateralism in entering war as one reason for
presidential dominance).
35 For an account of when Congress is more likely to engage, specifically on war powers,
see William G. Howell & Jon C. Pevehouse, While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks
on Presidential War Powers 33–49 (2007).
36 Vermeule, supra note 15, at 1142.
37 David Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency 38–40
(2006); Koh, supra note 14, at 1263–65.
38 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the
Madisonian Republic 4–5 (2010) (arguing that the President is constrained not by law but by
politics).
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Debates over the foreign affairs power focus primarily on questions of
authority over substance: Which body is charged with making major
policy decisions about a given question of foreign relations or national
security? On that metric, the President does “win” most (even almost all)
of the time, at least as a functional matter, even when the Constitution
explicitly grants Congress the authority in question.39 This is so for many
reasons—among them information asymmetries; the ability to act with
dispatch; the ability to act at all; and Congress’s cost-benefit analysis
about the political value of intervening in foreign affairs.40
Yet presidential primacy is not the end of the story. That the President
can ultimately act does not tell us what the President’s course of action
will be. Particularly in the foreign affairs realm where novel questions
often arise and policy preferences do not necessarily divide neatly along
partisan lines,41 there is often significant room for disagreement even
inside the executive branch over what action or policy the President
should adopt. And to bring this full circle, Congress has means at its
disposal to pressure and shape the nature of those internal debates and
decision-making processes.
This is where the foreign affairs debate could benefit from the literature
on congressional control over the bureaucracy, which I explore in the
Section that follows. Both together inform deeper consideration of the
multiplicity of ways actors outside the executive branch, including
Congress, shape Presidents’ actions and policies, as I explore in this
Article.
B. Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy
There are extensive literatures in both political science and public law
scholarship on Congress’s interest and efficacy in reining in and
otherwise controlling the federal bureaucracy. Much of this literature
focuses on domestic matters and often even explicitly brackets off the

39

See Koh, supra note 14, at 1292. Authorities that the Constitution delegates directly to
Congress, which Congress has then either handed over to the President or largely acquiesced
in his encroachment, include the power to declare war and the power to regulate international
commerce. Id. at 1297–1305.
40 See, e.g., id. at 1297–98 (analyzing “legislative myopia” and its effects on congressional
acquiescence); Wildavsky, supra note 14, at 7–14.
41 Wildavsky, supra note 14, at 7–14.
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foreign affairs or national security bureaucracy.42 Yet despite the possibly
exceptionalist nature of foreign affairs and national security, many of the
dynamics that scholarship on bureaucracy considers have relevance for
these fields as well. As I explain below, these literatures provide an
important jumping-off point for considering Congress’s role in
influencing executive branch foreign affairs process and policy.
As in the foreign policy space, scholars of congressional-executive
relations generally have long reckoned with, bemoaned, or defended what
has appeared to be congressional abdication to the President of greater
and greater power. With the rise of the administrative state and the
concomitant complexity of modern governance, Congress has
increasingly moved from narrow delegations of power to the President to
broad delegations that create a significant sphere of discretion within
which bureaucrats can act.43 One debate in modern scholarship considers
the extent to which the result of these broad delegations is an entirely
unconstrained, all-powerful President; among those who push this
“executive unbound” version of the presidency, there are many who warn
of its dangers, and others who view it as essentially a good state of
affairs.44
Others argue that the presidency is not, as an empirical matter, entirely
unconstrained. Scholars have pointed to legislative attempts to rein in the
President with substantive law, and the effectiveness of those efforts, even
in areas like national security and war where the conventional wisdom
says the President has enormous leeway.45 They have noted that even
when Congress fails to legislate, there are a number of other tools it has
at its disposal for making its interests known and influential.46 And there
is a significant body of scholarship examining the extent to which
Congress influences bureaucratic choices through its control over the

42 Some notable exceptions to this gap include Amy B. Zegart, Flawed by Design: The
Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC 17 (1999), and Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture
of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 Calif.
L. Rev. 1655, 1658 (2006) (analyzing the efficacy and ideal structure of agency design for
optimal national security outcomes in the wake of 9/11).
43 Kagan, supra note 13, at 2253–54.
44 Compare, e.g., Dyzenhaus, supra note 37, with Posner & Vermeule, supra note 38.
45 Jack Goldsmith, Power and Constraint: The Accountable Presidency After 9/11, at 30–35
(2012) (analyzing constraints on presidential power in wartime).
46 See Chafetz, supra note 22, at 3.
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design of agencies’ decision-making structure, rather than through
substantive legislation.47
Scholars have considered the extent to which Congress engages in “ex
ante” controls, like agency design, and “ongoing” controls, like oversight,
as a means of managing the bureaucracy, though they debate the purpose
of these controls.48 Some propose that Congress chooses agency design
to ensure that agencies hue to their statutory mandate, to, in effect,
“hardwire” them in order to reduce “bureaucratic drift.”49 Others maintain
that politicians design agencies primarily with policy preferences and
political purposes in mind, which may connect indirectly to efficiency and
good governance to the extent voters are informed on these matters.50 This
literature intersects with debates on the extent to which congressional
attempts at control have any real effect on bureaucratic outcomes,
whatever their purpose.51
Even scholars who do not necessarily see Congress as providing
significant constraints on the executive have pointed to other constraints
that rein in presidential prerogative. A burgeoning literature has
developed exploring the role of bureaucratic, or administrative,

47 Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures
as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. Econ. & Org. 243, 244 (1987).
48 David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics
Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers 25–29 (1999).
49 Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative
Agencies, 8 J.L. Econ. & Org. 93, 93 (1992) [hereinafter Macey, Organizational Design and
Political Control] (“[P]oliticians who establish administrative agencies can manipulate the
structure and design of those agencies in ways that reduce the chance that future changes in
the political landscape will upset the terms of the original understanding among the relevant
political actors.”); Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The
Tug of War Over Administrative Agencies, 80 Geo. L.J. 671, 671–72 (1992) (“The goal of
Congress is to ensure that administrative agencies generate outcomes that are consistent with
the original understanding that existed between Congress and the various interest groups that
were parties to the initial political compromise.”).
50 David E. Lewis, Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design: Political Insulation in the
United States Government Bureaucracy, 1946–1997, at 3, 161–62 (2003) (“[C]alculations
about the ‘proper’ design of administrative agencies are shaped less by concerns for efficiency
or effectiveness than by concerns about reelection, political control, and, ultimately, policy
outcomes.”); Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in Can the Government
Govern? 267, 267 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989) (“American public
bureaucracy is not designed to be effective. [It] arises out of politics, and its design reflects
the interests, strategies, and compromises of those who exercise political power.”).
51 Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, Agency Design and Political Control, 126 Yale
L.J. 1002, 1017–20 (2017).
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constraints reining in the President from inside the executive branch.52
But there is work yet to be done in considering the extent to which
congressional process controls on agency structure and design interact
with these constraints on the President from inside the executive branch.53
As I have explored in prior work, bureaucratic constraints on the
President can play a significant role in shaping the process and outcome
of executive branch decision making,54 but they are created, bolstered—
52 I have previously written about these internal constraints, including most recently in
Rebecca Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance and the National Security State, 104 Iowa L. Rev.
139, 144 (2018) [hereinafter Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance] (analyzing several distinct
categories of “resistance” inside the executive, among and between different sets of actors,
and the role of bureaucratic resistance in the separation of powers). See also Neal Kumar
Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from
Within, 115 Yale L.J. 2314, 2318 (2006) (finding bureaucratic constraints on presidential
power wanting); Gillian E. Metzger, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 7 (2017) (arguing that the administrative state is a necessary and required
constraint on presidential power); Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship
Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 Emory L.J. 423, 439–42 (2009)
(analyzing the advantages of internal separation of powers mechanisms); Jon D. Michaels, An
Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 515, 520 (2015) (arguing that
the administrative state plays a central role in the current separation of powers); Trevor W.
Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1688, 1716–20 (2011) (reviewing
Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic (2010)) (describing the
work of the Office of Legal Counsel as a constraint on the President).
53 Political scientist James Lindsay, who has written extensively on congressional
involvement in foreign policy making, is one of the rare scholars to consider the role of
congressional influence on process in the executive branch’s foreign policy decision-making
space. In his view, scholarship has “underestimate[d]” congressional influence on foreign
policy in part because “[p]olitical scientists [were] slow to recognize how process shapes
policy.” See James M. Lindsay, Congress and Foreign Policy: Why the Hill Matters, 107 Pol.
Sci. Q. 607, 616, 619–20 (1992) (discussing the influence of “[s]tructural and procedural
innovations” on policy, but noting that the efficacy of these innovations is difficult to answer
due to the “understudied” and “slippery” nature of the subject, which involves “anticipated
reactions and counterfactuals”); see also James M. Lindsay & Randall B. Ripley, How
Congress Influences Foreign and Defense Policy, in Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Defense
Policy on Capitol Hill 17, 17–18 (1993) (describing how Congress retains some influence over
foreign and defense policy). Lindsay and Ripley catalog five different types of what they call
“procedural legislation,” including variations of agency design, reporting, and certification
requirements, and “enfranchis[ing] new groups in the decision-making process.” Id. at 28–30.
Lindsay and Ripley do not examine the designation of or shift in executive branch decision
maker as a targeted tool of congressional control, but each of the statutory mechanisms they
discuss might be deployed as a means of designating or changing the decider over a particular
policy matter, as I explore in Part II.
54 Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance, supra note 52, at 144; Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts,
supra note 19, at 362, 370; Rebecca Ingber, The Obama War Powers Legacy and the Internal
Forces that Entrench Executive Power, 110 Am. J. Int’l L. 680, 680–81 (2016) [hereinafter
Ingber, The Obama War Powers Legacy].
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and can ultimately be undermined—by political sources, like Congress
and the President himself, as well as by courts. Beyond agency design,
Congress has numerous “hard” and “soft” tools at its disposal for
structuring and restructuring the process of decision making inside the
executive branch.55 And it deploys these tools for purposes in addition to,
and beyond that of, bureaucratic responsiveness to political pressure
alone, as I explore in this Article.
The foreign policy and national security spaces provide an especially
valuable lens for considering this interaction between Congress and
bureaucratic constraints, as there are numerous conflicting interests inside
the executive branch foreign policy and national security infrastructure,
with overlapping jurisdictions, and thus many levers to push and pull to
influence decision making. Moreover, novel issues arise or boil over at a
higher rate than in the purely domestic policy realm, providing new
“policy windows” for Congress and the President to consider matters with
fresh eyes.56
Drawing on these literatures, this Article considers a range of
mechanisms through which Congress shapes executive branch decision
making and thus the path of U.S. foreign policy. I focus in particular on a
set of process controls that are not theorized in scholarship on the
administrative state—the choice of internal executive branch decision
makers—and consider the purposes, efficacy, and risks of this tool of
congressional administration over the nation’s foreign policy.
II. PROCESS CONTROLS AS TOOLS OF FOREIGN POLICY
As I describe in Part I, Congress has, for a range of reasons, fallen short
in the foreign affairs arena. Whether it holds a significant body of formal
power that it refuses to use, or is in fact formally impotent in this sphere,
55 I borrow here the terms “hard” and soft” as applied to congressional power from Professor
Josh Chafetz, who in turn borrowed them from international relations theory. See Chafetz,
supra note 22, at 3 (describing two forms of congressional power: “hard” power to “coerce,”
such as the “power of the purse,” and other “soft” tools, such as internal rules of discipline
and proceedings).
56 John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies 165–68 (2d ed. 1995);
Jordan Tama, Presidential-Congressional Relations in Foreign Policy, in Rivals for Power:
Presidential-Congressional Relations 217, 218 (James A. Thurber & Jordan Tama eds., 6th ed.
2018) (noting the differences between foreign and domestic policy as a matter of partisan
division); Wildavsky, supra note 14, at 7–14 (stating, unpresciently, that “although any
president knows he supports foreign aid and NATO, the world outside changes much more
rapidly than the nation inside”).
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there is general agreement on this: Congress does not aggressively
legislate a substantive foreign policy agenda, and it certainly does not do
so at the expense of its domestic interests. This Part demonstrates,
however, that even as Congress often declines to pursue a substantive
foreign policy agenda directly, it can and does pursue an array of “process
controls” to influence the conduct of foreign affairs short of directing
which positions the President should adopt.
I use the term “process controls” here to encompass a range of
mechanisms Congress can and does deploy to manage executive branch
decision making. These include agency design and administrative
procedure requirements, as well as less familiar mechanisms like
switching the decision maker inside the executive branch. Process
controls permit members of Congress to influence the process and
direction of executive branch decision making indirectly, often with a
light touch, avoiding many of the pitfalls and political costs members may
fear would arise from more direct engagement in foreign policy making.
Moreover, process controls may even at times be more effective than
direct substantive legislation;57 while executive branch officials might
seek to interpret their way out of more substantive legislative constraints
in order to protect presidential power, process controls commandeer
executive branch officials and processes themselves to serve as internal
constraints on the President.58
Scholarship on the effects of agency design and administrative
procedure tends to focus on “political control” over the bureaucracy, a
term used to refer to the responsiveness and accountability of bureaucratic
actors to politicians, be they in Congress or the Oval Office.59 Does the
bureaucracy, in so many words, continue to make decisions that those
political actors who empowered them would want them to take? Yet
process controls can be animated by multiple purposes, beyond policy
preference. At times, in fact, the precise purpose for which members of
Congress may propose or support a particular mechanism is to remove
decisions from political control, and specifically from the intransigence
of partisan politics.
57

See infra Section III.B (discussing the efficacy of process controls).
See Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance, supra note 52, at 145.
59 See, e.g., David E. Lewis, The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control
and Bureaucratic Performance 6–7 (2008); Max Weber, Bureaucracy, in From Max Weber:
Essays in Sociology 196, 232 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 1948); Berry & Gersen,
supra note 51, at 1006–07.
58
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The choice of process control often connects to the reason members of
Congress may have for choosing this tool over another, more direct form
of policy engagement. Measures aimed at removing decisions from
partisan politics, for example, may be deployed if members of Congress
believe it is important to act on a particular matter, but they believe that
political sensitivities stand in the way of action unless they give the matter
to technocrats.60 Creating decision-making pathways inside the executive
branch allows members to shift the political burden off their shoulders
and onto those of technocrats who are free of such constraints.61 At other
times, by contrast, members may have specific policy preferences, but
may be reticent to act because of high political costs; they may see
deploying process controls as a way to effectuate or at least approximate
their preferences while shifting the cost burden. Even when their goal is
a preferred policy objective, members may believe they can more
effectively implement that policy through the use of these measures. They
may even choose these tools over more direct substantive legislation
mandating a particular policy for reasons of good government. They may
actually believe that the executive branch holds the upper hand due to its
expertise, or information, or ability, and yet nevertheless have views on
improving the process to effectuate better policies. And of course, as
Congress is itself anything but a monolith, any given measure that
Congress implements may be driven forward by multiple motivations,
varying among the members who propose and support it.62
This Part seeks to classify these different process controls according to
their form and function. I first address two forms of congressional control
over the bureaucracy that have been the subject of significant political
science and administrative law scholarship—agency design and
administrative procedure requirements—to consider how these measures
are and can be deployed as tools of foreign policy. But the focus of this
Part is the dissection of what I term “designated deciders”: measures that
shift the decision maker horizontally, such as from one agency head to
another, or vertically, upward toward a cabinet official, or downward
toward a technocrat; measures that excise responsibility and place it in a
See, e.g., Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 48, at 2 (discussion of base closures).
Id. at 9.
62 See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as
Oxymoron, 12 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 239, 248, 254 (1992) (arguing that legislative intent is
“nonsense” and that “[w]e do not know why [a bill passed], and it is likely that each legislator
has a mix of different reasons”).
60
61
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new body, at a distance removed from existing decision makers; and
measures that diffuse responsibility among several decision makers inside
the executive branch. I classify these process controls here, and consider
their purposes, efficacy, and risks in Part III.
A. Foreign Policy Through Institutional Design
A great deal of political science and administrative law scholarship has
been devoted to considering agency design as a tool for political control
of the bureaucracy.63 Much of this literature is devoted to specific ex ante
creation decisions, such as agency independence from the President as
measured by a single vector: control over appointment and removal of the
agency’s leadership.64 This focus has less salience in the foreign policy
and national security arenas, where presidential power over the
bureaucracy is arguably at its peak. Informal norms of independence for
some specific areas such as intelligence and law enforcement do exist, as
do occasional, narrowly tailored attempts at congressionally mandated
independence in these spheres, though the constitutionality of removing
these powers from presidential control remains a matter of hot debate.65
But agency independence is not the primary vector along which Congress
exerts influence in the foreign policy and national security arena. It is thus

Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 48, at 9; Lewis, supra note 59, at 2–10; Berry & Gersen,
supra note 51, at 1017; Moe, supra note 50, at 268; Macey, Organizational Design and Political
Control, supra note 49, at 100 (“[T]he politicians who create administrative agencies can limit
future agency costs not only by establishing procedural and substantive rules under which
such agencies must operate, but also through the initial organizational design of the agency
itself.”).
64 See Berry & Gersen, supra note 51, at 1012 (“The President’s ability to influence the
bureaucracy . . . depends on a range of institutional features, including whether the agency’s
leadership is insulated from presidential removal, the location of the agency inside or outside
the cabinet hierarchy, and the extent of presidential appointments in the agency, subject (or
not) to Senate approval.”); see also Lewis, supra note 59, at 28 (“Congress, at times, tries to
circumscribe the president’s influence with commissions instead of administrations, fixed
terms for appointees, qualifications for appointees, and location outside the cabinet.”).
65 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 659–60 (1988) (upholding the constitutionality of
an independent counsel); Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can the President Control the
Department of Justice?, 70 Ala. L. Rev. 1, 5 (2018) (arguing that “prosecutorial independence”
is in fact “built into the structure of American government”); Daphna Renan, Presidential
Norms and Article II, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 2187, 2207 (2018). Morrison is considered by many
to be anti-canon. See Adrian Vermeule, Morrison v. Olson Is Bad Law, Lawfare (June 9, 2017,
8:14 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/morrison-v-olson-bad-law [https://perma.cc/964BDTN6]. But see Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 379, 394 & n.80 (2011).
63
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worth considering the foreign policy implications of other aspects of
agency design.
Congress is involved in the institutional design of the foreign policy
and national security infrastructure from top to bottom. Most of the
agencies and offices are, of course, created by legislation,66 and Congress
has thus been the critical player in creating most of the structures that have
engaged our foreign policy since the Founding.67 That Congress chose to
lodge so much power in the presidency through the establishment of, for
example, a Secretary of State and executive agency engaged in foreign
affairs—the Department of State—wholly subordinate to the President
right from the beginning might suggest congressional acquiescence in the
executive’s foreign affairs predominance.68 But Congress’s role in the
institutional design of foreign policy does not begin and end with that
initial creation of a federal agency. Rather, Congress continues to remain
involved through both the regular creation—or termination—of offices
within these agencies, through the designation of personnel, including
their employment status and relationship to the President, and through the
earmarking of appropriations to agencies and offices.69
At times of great upheaval or controversy, Congress has engaged this
particular tool aggressively to restructure the foreign policy or national
security institutions of the U.S. government. After World War II,
66 Some, like the National Security Agency (NSA), are executive branch creations. See
George F. Howe, An Early History of the NSA 11, https://www.nsa.gov/Portals/70/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/cryptologic-spectrum/early_history_nsa.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TPB2-FRRH]. Some, like the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
begin as executive branch creations, in this case within the White House, and are later ratified
and created as a full agency through subsequent legislation. Homeland Security Act of 2002,
6 U.S.C. § 111 (2002).
67 The State Department was the first executive branch agency, created as the Department
of Foreign Affairs, in 1789. John Jay had been appointed the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs under the Articles of Confederation and served from 1784 until 1789. A Short History
of the Department of State: Diplomacy Under the Articles of Confederation, U.S. Dep’t of
State, https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/articles [https://perma.cc/AZ2Z-4RV6] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019). Thomas Jefferson became the first Secretary of State
in 1789, under the new legislation. Administrative Timeline of the Department of State, U.S.
Dep’t of State, https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/timeline/1789-1899 [https://perma.cc/ZF3V-UXSA] (last visited Nov. 23, 2019).
68 Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 25, at 300 (arguing that in creating this new Department
that was entirely beholden to the President, “Congress had cut itself out of the picture”).
69 See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2651a(f) (2018) (requiring the establishment of “a Coordinator of
United States Government Activities to Combat HIV/AIDS Globally . . . to operate
internationally to carry out prevention, care, treatment, support, capacity development, and
other activities for combatting HIV/AIDS”).
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Congress reorganized the bureaucracy of warfighting and intelligence
through the National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent statutes,
creating the National Security Council (NSC), the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), and other offices responsible for intelligence sprinkled
throughout the executive branch national security establishment, as well
as consolidating the armed services and civilian components of war into
one department, the Department of Defense (DOD).70 And Congress has
re-engaged in ways both small and big, including in response to the
Church and Pike Committees, and again after 9/11, to restructure the
intelligence community to rein in perceived excesses and resolve
perceived deficiencies.71
Often, Congress acts in conjunction with the President to engage in
shared foreign policy goals. Even within that context, negotiations over
precisely how to structure an agency or which programs to fund provide
members of Congress—and especially members of the relevant
committees—with a means to influence executive policy making,
including by narrowing executive requests even while agreeing to
delegate power.72
But at times, Congress engages its design tools in ways that directly
oppose the sitting President’s prerogatives, sometimes favoring specific
bureaucrats within the rest of the executive branch. This takes many
forms, including refusals to fund a presidential priority, which would have
a direct effect on the President’s policy making by entirely or partially

70 National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. §§ 3001, 3004, 3021, 3035 (2018). Professor
Amy Zegart has critiqued Congress’s design of these agencies, arguing that poor design has
led to major substantive policy failures. See Zegart, supra note 42, at 8.
71 S. Rep. No. 94-755, at III, IX (1976) (recommending, in the Final Report of the Senate
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities,
structural changes to the intelligence community in the wake of abuses during the Watergate
era). The House undertook its own investigation, through the Pike Committee, though its final
report was released only through subsequent leaks. See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 102, 118 Stat. 3638, 3644 (2004) (creating
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to oversee the executive branch Intelligence
Community); Gerald K. Haines, The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA, CIA (June
27, 2008), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/winter98_99/art07.html#rft0 [https://perma.cc/5D95-P47S].
72 See, e.g., David Abramowitz, The President, the Congress, and Use of Force: Legal and
Political Considerations in Authorizing Use of Force Against International Terrorism, 43
Harv. Int’l L.J. 71, 73 (2002) (discussing congressional pushback against executive branch
requests for an even broader grant of authority than what Congress ultimately enacted in the
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) of 2001).
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impeding it.73 It also includes the opposite: refusals to cut funding to
agencies or offices that Congress deems important, thus continuing the
work of bureaucrats within those agencies in disregard of the President’s
preferred approach. One prominent recent example from the past few
years is Congress’s repeated pushback against the Trump administration’s
aggressive proposals to cut the State Department budget, initially by
28%.74 During budget hearings in front of the House and Senate
Committees in 2017, members of Congress excoriated then-Secretary
Rex Tillerson’s proposed cuts as exhibiting poor foreign policy judgment
and potentially endangering national security.75 More important than the
rhetoric, Congress ultimately passed a spending bill that refused the
proposed budget cuts, instead making only modest cuts from 2017
levels.76
General appropriations and the creation of executive offices can be
both blunt and sharp instruments. In the broadest sense, Congress is
73 See Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No.
111-383, § 1032, 124 Stat. 4137, 4351 (2011) (prohibiting the use of funds to “transfer,
release, or assist in the transfer or release to or within the United States, its territories, or
possessions of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed or any other detainee who . . . is or was held on or
after January 20, 2009, at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,” thus
preventing the executive branch from pursuing criminal trials in the United States); see also
infra notes 89–102 and accompanying text (discussing National Defense Authorization Acts
passed during the Obama administration that conditioned funding for the closure of
Guantanamo on the Secretary of Defense certifying that the national security was not impaired
due to the release or transfer of a detainee).
74 Rex W. Tillerson, FY 2018 Congressional Budget Justification Secretary’s Letter, U.S.
Dep’t
of
State
(May
23,
2017),
https://www.state.gov/plans-performancebudget/international-affairs-budgets/fy-2018-international-affairs-budget/ [https://perma.cc/5R5G-P7SR]; Ronan Farrow, Inside Rex Tillerson’s Ouster, see also New Yorker (Apr. 19,
2018) https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/inside-rex-tillersons-ouster [https://perma.cc/RC5J-MQ3P].
75 The FY 2018 Foreign Affairs Budget, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs,
115th Cong. 1–3 (2017) (statement of Rep. Edward Royce, Chairman, H. Comm. on Foreign
Affairs); Carol Morello & Anne Gearan, Senators Sharply Question State Department Budget
Cuts, Wash. Post (June 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/tillerson-argues-state-departments-main-focus-should-be-on-us-security/2017/06/13/0438ebdc-503f-11e7-be25-3a519335381c_story.html?utm_term=.df96264f3e8c [https://perma.cc/HLN3-6X2S].
76 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, Div. K., 132 Stat. 348,
833–971 (2018); see Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-31, Div. J., 131
Stat. 135, 589–724 (2017). Notably, the bill included aid for programs that the Trump
Administration had proposed severely cutting. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Spending Plan Passed
by Congress Is a Rebuke to Trump. Here’s Why, N.Y. Times (Mar. 22, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/22/us/politics/trump-government-spending-bill.html
[https://perma.cc/BT2Y-HMGY].
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creating the fora in which foreign policy decision making occurs, and by
insisting on funding the State Department, for example, at levels similar
to recent history, Congress makes clear that it intends the executive
branch to continue to use the “soft” power of diplomacy alongside the
“hard” power of military force. But such appropriations themselves can
also include more directed tools—for example, the 2018 fiscal bill
included foreign assistance for HIV programs that the Trump
administration had wanted to cut, specifically ensuring the continuation
of an office devoted to policy objectives contrary to the President’s.77
The existence of a building and offices with funding alone does not
direct policy outcomes, of course, but members of Congress are well
aware that individual agencies have distinct mandates and that personnel
tend to gravitate toward offices and agencies that match their priorities.
Thus, privileging funding for, say, the State Department will prioritize a
different set of policy goals—specifically diplomacy, soft power, and
foreign aid—than would privileging funding for the Department of
Defense. Creating the fora for particular types of decision making and
ensuring that they remain populated with personnel devoted to a particular
mandate creates path dependencies and presumptions that favor
continuity of particular policy objectives and hurdles to significant
change. And at the other extreme, the defunding or closure of particular
offices can have a significant impact on the executive branch’s ability to
engage a particular area or policy objective. When Congress allocates
funding to or away from particular agencies and offices, it privileges
certain personnel and certain kinds of decision making over others, and
this will shape policy outcomes.
B. Foreign Policy Through Administrative Procedure
Scholars of administrative law and political science have considered
Congress’s ability to control the executive branch through the imposition
of administrative procedures, in particular the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA), which mandates procedures through which executive branch
agencies must make certain decisions.78 The APA itself largely exempts
from its application the executive branch’s foreign policy and national

77 132 Stat. at 844–46; ONE, Red Ribbon or White Flag? The Future of the U.S. Global
AIDS Response 7–8 (Nov. 29, 2017), https://s3.amazonaws.com/one.org/pdfs/ONE_WAD_Report_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/6J6K-ADE4].
78 See, e.g., McCubbins et al., supra note 47, at 243, 246.
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security decision making.79 But Congress imposes a variety of procedural
requirements outside of the APA on the foreign policy and national
security decision making of the executive branch—such as requirements
that the executive branch certify that specific criteria are met before it can
act to, say, provide aid to a foreign nation;80 or that it make a finding in
writing before it may take covert action;81 or that the President report
regularly to Congress on his use of military force.82
Scholars of political science and economics McCubbins, Noll, and
Weingast suggest that Congress turns to administrative procedures as a
means of ensuring congressional control over the bureaucracy because of
the sheer impossibility of controlling every decision that the bureaucracy
makes.83 In other words, administrative procedures are a second-best
alternative for members of Congress who would otherwise seek to control
the substance of decision making directly. As I explore in this Article,
however, there are multiple reasons—beyond the sheer scale of decisions
that must be made—that Congress might turn to process over substance
as a means of influencing policy, and this may be exacerbated in the
foreign policy context where Congress is even less inclined to legislate
substance than it is in the domestic sphere.
Scholars have considered the extent to which specific procedures have
a real effect on government outcomes. Many have argued that
certification requirements, for example, are not effective in constraining
presidential decision making.84 As I discuss in Part III, however, the
efficacy of any given process control depends on a variety of factors,
including context and the relevant actors, and must be weighed against
the likelihood of the alternatives, respectively, inaction or substantive
congressional legislation.
A significant body of work applying principles of administrative law
to foreign policy and national security focuses not on the efficacy of
specific administrative procedure requirements, but on the extent to which
79 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2018) (exempting “military or foreign
affairs function of the United States”). And the Supreme Court has held that the President is
not covered by the APA. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 789 (1992).
80 See Mark A. Chinen, Presidential Certifications in U.S. Foreign Policy Legislation, 31
N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 217, 221 (1999); Stephen B. Cohen, Conditioning U.S. Security
Assistance on Human Rights Practices, 76 Am. J. Int’l L. 246, 247 (1982).
81 50 U.S.C. § 3093(a)(1) (2018).
82 50 U.S.C. § 1543(c) (2018).
83 McCubbins et al., supra note 47, at 244.
84 Chinen, supra note 80, at 233–35.
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the executive branch should be afforded deference on matters of war and
national security.85 A thorough discussion of the role of courts in
influencing policy through their allocation of power inside the executive
branch is outside the scope of this Article, but it is the subject of a
forthcoming project. Suffice it to say here that statutory process
requirements are interwoven with judicial review—they are a means by
which Congress can more effectively commandeer the courts to help it
oversee and influence executive branch policy making, and to do so
without necessarily seeking direct responsibility over the policy itself.
C. Foreign Policy Through Designated Deciders
The primary focus of this Part is a third category of process control that
has received little attention in scholarship: the designation or modification
of executive branch decision maker as a means of influencing policy.
The choice of decider is a process control connected to, and at times
deployed through the use of, agency design and administrative
procedures. It is a highly tailored tool, and can have a significant, targeted
effect on the policy positions of the U.S. government. Members of
Congress may seek to deploy this measure for multiple purposes: to
advance a particular policy objective, to depoliticize particular decisions
or prioritize expertise, or to constrain the President. They may seek to
institutionalize a particular decision-making process long term, perhaps
for purposes of more efficient governance,86 or they may seek to advance
specific short-terms goals, by, for example, designating a particular
decision maker inside the executive branch who they believe holds views
more in line with their policy preferences than the alternative deciders.87
These purposes may and do overlap; moreover different members of
Congress may be compelled by different motivations in supporting the
same control measure.
85

See, e.g., Harlan Grant Cohen, Formalism and Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law in the
Roberts Court, 83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 380, 384–85 (2015); Deborah N. Pearlstein, After
Deference: Formalizing the Judicial Power for Foreign Relations Law, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 783,
784–86 (2011); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116
Yale L.J. 1170, 1173, 1177–78 (2007); Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The
Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1897, 1904–05 (2015); Cass R.
Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2663, 2664 (2005).
86 See infra Subsection II.C.3 (discussing the use of process controls as a means of
effectuating military base closures).
87 See supra notes 1–10 and accompanying text (detailing the Trump Administration’s use
of Section 232 as a justification for imposing tariffs).
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The choice of decision maker may take different functional forms, each
of which may be usefully deployed for different specific purposes and
hold different advantages and risks—to transparency, accountability, and
effectiveness in meeting a particular purpose. Some process controls shift
decision-making authority up to a high-level official, which may increase
transparency but may also politicize decision making. Other process
controls shift deciders horizontally, which could result in a major policy
change if the substitution occurs between decision makers who hold
opposing views. And still others diffuse decision making among different
deciders or allocate it downward to technocrats and career officials. This
Section dissects and classifies this form of process control according to
function. I then consider the advantages, efficacy, and risks involved in
deploying process controls in Part III.
1. Vertical Shift in Decider
One process control that Congress deploys is to shift decision-making
authority up or down the hierarchy within the executive branch. This
designation may take the form of a delegation of authority to a particular
agency head, but other procedural tools—such as a certification
requirement, waiver authority, or reporting obligation—may each be
deployed as a means of channeling decision-making authority in a
particular office, or of shifting decision-making authority further down
the chain of command. This category of process control may be deployed
for the purpose of promoting a particular policy objective by advantaging
a favored agency or official, constraining presidential prerogative, or
ensuring that a particular agency’s expertise is deployed in a decisionmaking process. It could also be motivated by an interest in increasing
accountability for a particular type of decision.88 Shifting decisionmaking authority up to, say, the head of an agency, or even to the
President, might be done for the purpose of increasing accountability for
a matter or raising its profile in the public eye. Shifting authority down,
by contrast, might be done for the purpose of taking a matter out of the
hands of the President, and, if shifted to career bureaucrats, of setting a
decision at a remove from partisan politics or of ensuring expertise is
prioritized in the process.
Congressional responses to then-President Barack Obama’s pledge to
shutter the military detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay provide an
88

See infra Section III.A (discussing purposes for congressional use of process controls).
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example of both types of vertical shifts—a shift away from presidential
control as well as away from anonymous bureaucratic decision making
through the imposition of specific certification requirements on a
particular executive branch official, here the Secretary of Defense.
A brief history is necessary for background: Obama’s predecessor,
President George W. Bush, who first turned to the naval base at
Guantanamo as a location for military detention facilities in the conflict
with al Qaeda, himself ultimately asserted a policy of closing the
detention facilities.89 Nevertheless, Obama became inextricably linked
with the closure effort, as he made it a campaign pledge while running for
President and as one of his very first actions in office issued an executive
order commanding its closure within a year.90 To do so, he established
working groups that would review the case for detention and recommend
disposition (transfer, release, or continued detention) for each detainee at
Guantanamo.91
Opposition to this plan soon grew in Congress, with many members
calling for the facility to remain open.92 Beginning in 2010, members of
Congress attached to the defense appropriations bill onerous restrictions
on the President’s ability to transfer detainees from facilities abroad.93
Rather than simply mandate that Guantanamo remain open, either by
prohibiting the use of funds to close it (as Congress ultimately did94), or
by denying funds for transfers full stop (as Congress also ultimately did
for several countries95), Congress enacted requirements that the Secretary
of Defense make rigid certifications about the security threat of any
89 See Jack Goldsmith, The Bush Administration Wanted to Close GTMO Because (in Part)
of its Propaganda Value to Jihadists, Lawfare (Feb. 5, 2015, 8:31 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/bush-administration-wanted-close-gtmo-because-part-itspropaganda-value-jihadists [https://perma.cc/6WTY-SRX8] (citing President George W.
Bush as stating that the detention facility had become a recruiting tool for al Qaeda, and thus
that he had “worked to find a way to close the prison without compromising security”).
90 Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base and
Closure of Detention Facilities, Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897, at § 3 (Jan. 27,
2009).
91 Id. at § 4.
92 See infra note 99.
93 See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81,
§ 1028, 125 Stat. 1298, 1567–69 (2011); Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 1033(b)(5), 124 Stat. 4137, 4352 (2011).
94 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 1035,
130 Stat. 2000, 2391 (2016).
95 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, § 1033,
129 Stat. 726, 968–69 (2015).
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transfer thirty days before it could occur.96 Among the requirements, these
provisions mandated that before a detainee could be transferred to a
foreign country, the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the
Secretary of State, must certify that the government in question
has agreed to take effective steps to ensure that the individual cannot
take action to threaten the United States, its citizens, or its allies in the
future; [and] has taken such steps as the Secretary determines are
necessary to ensure that the individual cannot engage or reengage in
any terrorist activity. 97

The result of this designation was that Congress took functional
decision-making authority out of the hands of a panel of career executive
branch officials from national security offices throughout the executive
branch, as dictated by executive order, and funneled it more squarely and
transparently into the (reluctant) hands of the Secretary of Defense.98
There may have been multiple purposes animating Congress’s
deployment of this process control: certainly some members held strong
policy preferences in favor of keeping the detention facilities at
Guantanamo open, and placing constraints on transfers was a means to
that end.99 These preferences may have been motivated by, or simply
coincided with, the views of some within the national security
bureaucracy inside the government, who reportedly opposed closure of
the facilities and made those views known—including through regular
reports on broadly defined detainee recidivism—to members of
Congress.100 Other members may have held less strongly formed views
96

§ 1028, 125 Stat. at 1567–69; § 1033(b)(5), 124 Stat. at 4352.
§ 1033(b)(4)–(5), 124 Stat. at 4352 (emphasis added).
98 Exec. Order No. 13,567, 3 C.F.R. §§ 3, 9(b) (2011) (designating a “Periodic Review
Board” of senior officials from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Homeland
Security, the Offices of the Director of National Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to review the continued detention of Guantanamo detainees). The Secretary of
Defense was charged with coordinating the review and, along with the Secretary of State, was
responsible for the safe transfer of detainees who did not meet the standard for continued
detention. Id. at §§ 3, 4.
99 Katie Glueck, Graham: Gitmo’s “Crazy Bastards,” Politico (Nov. 30, 2012),
https://www.politico.com/story/2012/11/sen-lindsey-graham-calls-guantanamo-baydetainees-crazy-bastards-084449 [https://perma.cc/44SA-U57V]; Mitch McConnell, There
Are No Good Alternatives to Guantanamo, Wash. Post (Mar. 15, 2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/13/AR2009031302907.html [https://perma.cc/6TQK-Q9YW].
100 See Aziz Z. Huq, The President and the Detainees, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 499, 544–54 (2017)
(positing that bureaucratic resistance to Obama may have been a driving force behind
97
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on keeping Guantanamo open, and might not have supported a substantive
bill to that effect, but were willing to support—or felt they could not
oppose—provisions requiring that the Defense Secretary certify that
transfers out of the prison were not a threat.101
Whatever the motivations of various members of Congress in
deploying this process control, it appears to have had a significant effect
on the substantive policy of Guantanamo closure. By designating the
Secretary of Defense as the decider in this context, and not just the decider
but the public face of the determination, Congress harnessed the reticence
of the Secretary of Defense to make such certifications and placed its
thumb on the scale on the side of those within the Department of Defense
and elsewhere in the executive branch who opposed closing the facility in
internal conflict over Guantanamo transfers.102 With the certification
requirements in place, the flow of detainees from Guantanamo slowed to
a near halt.103
2. Horizontal Shift in Decider
Congress may at times seek to shift decision-making authority from
one official inside the administration to another at the same rank, such as
from one head of an agency to another. This process control may be
motivated by a policy agenda, if, for example, there is a belief that one
individual’s policy views may be preferable to another’s. Or the
implementation of such a control may simply reflect a view that a
particular office is better suited for such decisions, or that the public may
perceive that to be the case.

legislative efforts to halt transfers); Ingber, The Obama War Powers Legacy, supra note 54, at
685–86; Connie Bruck, Why Obama Has Failed to Close Guantánamo, New Yorker (July 25,
2016),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/08/01/why-obama-has-failed-to-closeguantanamo [https://perma.cc/MEU7-ZKDG] (discussing opposition to closing Guantanamo
within the Department of Defense).
101 See, e.g., infra note 166 and accompanying text.
102 Bruck, supra note 100 (quoting a senior defense official as stating that the certification
requirements changed the internal debate, whereas previously, due to the Administration’s
“focus on closing Guantánamo—you risked your job if you weren’t on board,” the statutory
requirements gave officials “the ability to be openly in favor of transferring people but unable
to do it, because of the law”).
103 Jennifer K. Elsea & Michael John Garcia, Cong. Research Serv., R42143, Wartime
Detention Provisions in Recent Defense Authorization Legislation 30 (Mar. 14, 2016),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42143.pdf [https://perma.cc/M83P-7BLQ] (acknowledging
the slowdown but asserting agnosticism as to the reason).

COPYRIGHT © 2020 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

426

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 106:395

An example of a horizontal shift is the changing placement of decisionmaking authority over tariffs, and specifically the national security
justification for imposing tariffs, that I discuss in the Introduction. Section
232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, currently authorizes
the President to impose restrictions on imports if the Commerce
Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, finds them
necessary to mitigate a threat to national security.104 Recent
communications between the Commerce and Defense Secretaries in
accordance with this legislative requirement unearthed concerns by thenSecretary of Defense James Mattis that tariffs proposed by the President
and supported by the Commerce Secretary would exacerbate, rather than
resolve, national security concerns.105 Perhaps hoping to leverage the
Pentagon’s caution in this area, several bipartisan groups in Congress
have proposed bills that would amend Section 232 to place more direct
authority squarely in the hands of the Defense Secretary to constrain the
President from imposing tariffs under this provision.106
Congress does not turn to process controls to influence trade policy and
constrain the President out of a want of formal authority to direct United
States trade policy itself. The Constitution gives to Congress, not the
President, the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations.107 That
the President today holds significant power to impose tariffs is the result
of a series of expanding congressional delegations, delegations that
Congress could roll back, but thus far has not.108
And yet, Congress has repeatedly deployed process controls as a means
of influencing trade policy instead of dialing back delegations of
authority, even at times deploying these controls alongside expansions of

104

19 U.S.C. § 1862 (2018).
See Letter from Mattis to Ross, supra note 4 (expressing skepticism that the tariffs at
issue were necessary to national security and concerns that they could instead strain
relationships with allies).
106 See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text; see also Press Release, Sen. Doug Jones,
Sens. Jones, Portman, Ernst Introduce Bipartisan Legislation to Reform National Security
Tariff Process & Increase Congressional Oversight (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.jones.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/senators-jones-portman-ernst-introduce-bipartisanlegislation-to-reform-national-security-tariff-process-and-increase-congressional-oversight
[https://perma.cc/NA2M-YY23] (stating that placing the decision authority over the national
security justification directly in the hands of the Defense Secretary would “ensure that the
statute is used for genuine national security purposes” (emphasis added)).
107 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
108 See infra notes 109–10.
105
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such delegations.109 In fact, the horizontal shift contemplated by these
recent bills is a frequently deployed move for Congress as a means of
influencing U.S. trade policy. Congress has already shifted the decision
maker for this particular tariff justification about four times, give or take,
since it began delegating control over tariffs to the executive branch in
the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930—from a series of offices within the
White House, to the Treasury Department, to the Commerce Department,
and now it may well move the authority again, to the Department of
Defense.110
The history of Congress’s horizontal shifts in decision maker aligns
with—and can be partially explained by—an evolution in Congress’s
policy preferences on trade vis-à-vis the President throughout this period.
The relative positions of the President and Congress have shifted
dramatically in the Trump administration from previous political contexts
when Congress deployed these controls. At the time of the Smoot-Hawley
Tariff Act of 1930, it was Congress looking to restrict imports as a means
109 As an example, in 1934, Congress expanded the President’s power to enter into trade
agreements and adjust tariffs in conjunction with those agreements. An Act to Amend the
Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 73-316, 48 Stat. 943 (1934). The stated intention of the Act at
the time was to empower the President to reduce tariffs quickly in the midst of the Great
Depression, in accordance with powers held by executives in other states. H.R. Rep. No. 1000,
at 5 (1934). Twenty years later, while continuing to extend this authorization, Congress
enacted the first version of the national security justifications for tariff adjustment with the
intention of providing industries an opportunity to petition for tariff protection. Trade
Agreements Extension Act of 1955, ch. 169, § 7, 69 Stat. 162, 166 (1955); 101 Cong. Rec.
5298 (1955) (noting benefits associated with having a single director in charge who would be
responsive to industry).
110 See, e.g., Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1501,
102 Stat. 1107, 1257–60 (1988) (maintaining Commerce Department authority over Section
232 of the Trade Expansion Act but requiring consultation with the Department of Defense);
Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 127(d), 88 Stat. 1978, 1993–94 (1975) (shifting
power from the Office of Emergency Planning to the Department of Treasury); Trade
Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 232(b), 76 Stat. 872, 877 (1962) (shifting power
from the Office of Military and Civilian Mobilization to the Office of Emergency Planning);
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-686, § 8, 72 Stat. 673, 678–79
(1958) (moving power to the Office of Civilian and Defense Mobilization); Trade Agreements
Extension Act of 1955 § 7 (lodging the power in the Office of Defense Mobilization). At
times, these changes simply reflected changes in name or combining of offices by the
executive. See, e.g., Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, 23 Fed. Reg. 4991 (July 1, 1958)
(combining offices to create the Office of Civilian and Defense Mobilization). But Congress
played a role in each shift—reorganization plans gave Congress the opportunity to reject the
transfers of office, but Congress instead ratified them. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 96-402, at 24
(1979) (approving of the transfer of authority from the Treasury Department to the Commerce
Department).
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of protecting domestic industry, and the President seeking the flexibility
to increase or decrease tariffs.111 Smoot-Hawley established a series of
tariffs and empowered a body called the Tariff Commission, whose
members were appointed by the President with the advice and consent of
the Senate,112 to report to the President on the need to adjust them, giving
the President the authority to approve those recommended changes as
necessary.113 Subsequent statutes expanded the President’s authority to
adjust tariffs, and the 1955 Extension of Trade Agreement Authority first
codified the national security justification, requiring the Director of the
Office of Defense Mobilization (an office within the White House)114 to
investigate national security concerns with imports and report to the
President, who was then permitted to adjust imports in accordance with
the report after he conducted his own independent investigation.115 After
additional extensions,116 Congress codified the national security
exception in the 1962 Trade Act and changed the title of the responsible
111 Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 330(a), 46 Stat. 590, 696–697 (1930); H. Rep. No. 71–7,
at 3 (1929) (“Speaking generally, [tariffs have] served the country well. The past six years
have been years of unprecedented development . . . . However, many new products have
entered the markets since 1922, new conditions have arisen in production, new and active
competitors have entered the field, the duties on some goods . . . as provided in the tariff of
1922 . . . were placed too low.”); see also 71 Cong. Rec. 1748 (1929) (statement of Rep. Beck)
(arguing against a flexible tariff provision because a President could “summarily reduce tariff
rates at a rate so rapid and bewildering that a great many manufacturers in this country will
rue the day when they ever vested such power in a single functionary”). For his part, President
Hoover, while nevertheless defending protectionism, argued for a more limited and flexible
tariff power, one not necessarily opposed to reducing them in appropriate circumstances.
Herbert Hoover, Message from the President of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 71-1, at 1, 4
(1929) (noting that “I have called this special session of Congress to redeem two pledges given
in the last election—farm relief and limited changes in the tariff” and arguing that “[i]n
determining changes in our tariff we must not fail to take into account the broad interests of
the country as a whole, and such interests include our trade relations with other countries. It
is obviously unwise protection which sacrifices a greater amount of employment in exports to
gain a less amount of employment from imports”). President Hoover concluded by stating that
“[s]even years of experience have proved the principle of flexible tariff to be practical, and in
the long view a most important principle to maintain.” Id. at 4–5.
112 The Commission itself was created in a separate earlier act. Revenue Act, Pub. L. No.
64-271, § 700, 39 Stat. 756, 795 (1916). At the time, however, the Commission filled an
investigatory and advisory role, with little power to alter existing tariff rates. Id. § 706.
113 Tariff Act of 1930 § 330(a).
114 The Office of Defense Mobilization was created during the Truman administration. Exec.
Order No. 10193, 15 Fed. Reg. 9031 (Dec. 19, 1950) (creating office and designating the
appointment procedure of advice and consent by the Senate).
115 Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955 § 7.
116 Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-686, § 8, 72 Stat. 673, 678–79
(1958) (extending temporary authorization).
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office to the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning to align with
the name change within the White House.117
The legislative history provides some context for the decision to deploy
these controls to place some decision-making authority over the national
security justification in the hands of this White House office. In particular,
there was a sense among members of Congress and industry lobbyists that
obligating this office to issue a report would be more, not less, likely to
result in a decision to impose tariffs than placing the power with the
President directly, either because the President might himself be opposed,
or because taking the explicit authority away from the Director of the
Office of Emergency Planning would empower other stakeholders inside
the executive branch—namely the State Department—who might have
reasons, such as diplomatic concerns, to oppose tariffs.118 In fact,
representatives from affected industries hoping to convince the President
to levy tariffs testified before Congress to this effect, arguing in favor of
keeping the reporting requirement with the Office of Emergency
Planning.119 A representative of the textile industries testified that the
117

Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 232(b), 76 Stat. 872, 877 (1962).
The name change was effectuated in response to a request from President Kennedy, who had
transferred much of the authority of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization to the
Department of Defense. See Office of Emergency Planning Establishment Act, Pub. L. No.
87-296, 75 Stat. 630 (1961) (codifying change of name to the Office of Emergency Planning).
This name was again altered in 1968 to the Office of Emergency Preparedness. See
Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1969, Pub. L. No. 90-608, § 402, 82 Stat. 1190, 1194 (1968).
118 See, e.g., Trade Expansion Act of 1962: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways and
Means on H.R. 9900 Part 5, 87th Cong. 3063 (1962) [hereinafter Hearings, Part 5] (statement
of Eugene Stewart, Counsel, Man-Made Fibre Producers Association, Inc.); id. (statement of
Rep. Baker) (“So, in effect, if we enact [the 1962 Trade Expansion Act] without amendment
in this field, we will have repealed the national security provision of existing law.”); Trade
Expansion Act of 1962: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means on H.R. 9900
Part 4, 87th Cong. 2715–16 (1962) [hereinafter Hearings, Part 4] (statement of Harry B.
Purcell, Vice President, The Torrington Company) (“To leave to the sole determination of the
person who occupies the White House which tariff cuts would or would not ‘threaten to impair
the national security’ would be sheer folly.”); see also S. Rep. No. 100-82, at 18 (1987)
(describing overall changes in trade policy during this period and noting that “the State
Department was criticized for sacrificing U.S. trade interests for other foreign policy
concerns”).
119 Hearings, Part 4, supra note 118, at 2715–16 (statement of Harry B. Purcell, Vice
President, The Torrington Company) (“To leave to the sole determination of the person who
occupies the White House which tariff cuts would or would not ‘threaten to impair the national
security’ would be sheer folly.”); see also Trade Expansion Act of 1962: Hearings Before the
H. Comm. on Ways and Means on H.R. 9900 Part 3, 87th Cong. 1460 (1962) (statement of
Donald J. Hawthorne) (arguing in favor on behalf of the watch industry); id. at 1569, 1577–
78 (statement of Ralph Frey) (arguing in favor on behalf of the watch industry); id. at 1723
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State Department was in fact “resisting a finding by the Office of Civil
and Defense Mobilization, now called the Office of Emergency Planning,
that imports of textiles are threatening to impair the national security.”120
Were Congress to remove that office from the language of the statute, the
representative worried, the President might not choose to request their
advice, out of concern that “a favorable finding in the national security
case by the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization . . . would cause
some inconvenience so far as diplomatic relations with foreign
countries.”121 Instead, such a statute “would facilitate the ease with which
the State Department can subvert and oppose and prevent favorable
findings in these national security cases.”122 In other words, industry
professionals believed that despite the Office of Emergency Planning’s
placement inside the White House, a reporting requirement placed on that
office would be more likely to compel the President to levy tariffs than
were the same substantive delegation made to him directly, because he
might in that case prioritize the views of other actors inside the executive
branch, namely the State Department.123
Over subsequent amendments, Congress continued to shift the decider
over the national security justification, changing the designation first to
the Secretary of the Treasury,124 when the Office of Emergency Planning
was abolished,125 and then to the Secretary of Commerce.126 At one point,
industry representatives, particularly the precision ball bearing industry,
lobbied Congress to shift the authority to the Defense Department, based
on suggestions that Defense officials would have been more favorable to

(statement of John H. Lichtblau) (arguing to keep the procedure and limit the time permitted
for reports). But see id. at 1820 (statement of Otis H. Ellis, General Counsel, National Oil
Jobbers Council, Inc.) (arguing against the national security justification); id. at 1380–81
(statement of Charles W. Engelhard) (arguing that the defense provision is a “cloak for the
narrowest protectionist pressures”).
120 Hearings, Part 5, supra note 118, at 3063 (statement of Eugene Stewart, Counsel, Fibre
Producers Association, Inc.).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 127(d), 88 Stat. 1978, 1993–94 (1975).
125 Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1973, § 3, 38 Fed. Reg. 9579 (1973) (disbanding the office
and transferring powers held by the office to the Treasury Department).
126 Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979, § 5(a)(1)(B), 44 Fed. Reg. 69273, 69274 (1979); see
also Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1501, 102 Stat.
1107, 1257–1260 (1988); Trade Act of 1974 § 127(d).
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industry interests in promoting tariffs.127 One member of Congress
vociferously argued in favor of shifting the authority to DOD, and
suggested that the Deputy Secretary of Defense and other executive
branch officials shared this belief.128 Ultimately, Congress landed on a
compromise solution and amended Section 232 to require that the
Treasury Secretary, and later the Secretary of Commerce, consult with
and receive an assessment from the Secretary of Defense.129
Many of these shifts appear to have been prompted at least in part by
an interest in meeting the concerns of industry officials who hoped to
prompt the President to levy, rather than to constrain, tariffs on particular
industries, in a context where he was deemed unlikely to do so were he
granted the authority unilaterally. Today we find the policy preferences
reversed: the President is inclined to use his delegated authorities to
impose tariffs, and Congress appears to be seeking ways to constrain
him.130 In both of these contexts, however, members of Congress have
turned to process controls rather than changes to substantive delegations
of power in order to effectuate their preferences.131

127 Tariff and Trade Proposals Part 12: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means,
91st Cong. 3345–50 (1970) (statement of Rep. James C. Cleveland).
128 Id.
129 Trade Act of 1974 § 127(d). The requirement of consultation with the Department of
Defense continued into the next iteration of the national security justification. Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 1501. The decision to lodge the power exclusively in the
Secretary of Treasury and then the Commerce Department, rather than the Department of
Defense, appears to be due to concerns about access to necessary economic data. Threat of
Certain Imports to National Security: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 99th Cong. 24–
26 (1986) (statement of Sen. Byrd) (“The Commerce Department has much of the economic
data on American industries and the scope of foreign imports; but this is not a conventional
trade question. The language of the statute makes it clear that the threat of injury to national
security must be assessed after weighing many factors, many of them within the expertise of
the Department of Defense.”).
130 Nevertheless, concerns regarding the potential abuse of Section 232 were voiced by
congressmembers at the time of the passage of these various amendments, but they were
largely overridden by a belief in the prudential nature of the executive office. See, e.g., H.R.
Rep. No. 93-571, at 199 (1973) (minority views) (“There is no question that this bill would
make the President of the United States the foreign trade czar of this Nation.”); see also Press
Release, Sen. Rob Portman, supra note 11 (noting recent bipartisan congressional efforts to
limit Section 232 power).
131 See Press Release, Sen. Rob Portman, supra note 11 (arguing that delegation to the
Department of Defense rather than the Department of Commerce would effectuate the goals
of Section 232).
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3. Excision of Decision-Making Responsibility and Power
At times Congress may seek to create new entities as a means of
placing decision making at a remove from existing options. Congress’s
handling of the impasse over military base closures in the late 1980s by
creating a new commission to make the necessary decisions is a prime
example of congressional excision of decision making.
In the wake of the Vietnam War, after the Department of Defense under
President Kennedy closed over sixty military bases, decisions to close
military bases became politically fraught. The Department of Defense
was determined to cut costs by eliminating “underutilized” bases, and yet
closing any given military base entailed a sure loss of jobs, raising the
profile of base closures on the domestic policy agenda for Congress.132
Congress passed legislation increasingly involving itself in base closure
decisions, ultimately in 1977 mandating that they approve all large base
closures.133 Yet voting for base closure was a political hot potato; no
politician could support closing a military base in his or her own
district.134 As a result, it became nearly impossible for the Department of
Defense to close military bases, at significant cost.135
Ultimately, in response in part to changing politics, budgetary
concerns, and lobbying efforts by the Department of Defense, the concept
of closing military bases gained support in Congress, at least in theory.136
But the question remained how to make that happen considering the
domestic political costs. Delegating the decision directly to DOD did not
resolve the political question, as the Secretary of Defense was himself a
political appointee.137 The solution—proposed by DOD and adopted by
Congress—was to delegate decisions about base closures to a bipartisan
commission appointed by the Secretary of Defense that would report both

132 Def. Sec’y’s Comm’n on Base Realignment & Closure, Base Realignments and
Closures: Report of the Defense Secretary’s Commission 6–8, 29 (Dec. 1988) (on file with
author) [hereinafter 1988 BRAC Report]; Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 48, at 1–4.
133 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (2018) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 95-82, tit. VI, § 612(a) (1977))
(requiring congressional approval for “the closure of any military installation at which at least
300 civilian personnel are authorized to be employed”).
134 1988 BRAC Report, supra note 132, at 8–9; Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 48,
at 1–4.
135 1988 BRAC Report, supra note 132, at 8–9 (noting that “[s]ince passage of this
legislation over a decade ago, there has not been a single major base closure”).
136 Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 48, at 2.
137 Id. at 3.
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to him and to Congress.138 The Secretary of Defense and Congress
retained a veto over the ultimate proposal—each could take action to
reject the Commission’s list in its entirety—but the process allowed them
to shift the political costs of choosing a base onto the independent
commission, an entity less inclined to feel such costs.139
4. Diffusion of Decision-Making Responsibility and Power
At other times members of Congress may seek to diffuse decisionmaking responsibility and power, rather than channel it to a decisionmaking body. This may be done through a variety of measures, including
concurrent delegations to multiple agencies, requirements of
coordination, and mandatory consultation provisions.140 Such
requirements are fairly common, particularly in the domestic regulatory
space, and may be motivated by various purposes. Professors Jody
Freeman and Jim Rossi identify several different rationales for
overlapping control in their article, Agency Coordination in Shared
Regulatory Space, including: turf wars among members of congressional
committees; an interest in removing decision making from the President;
desire to include multiple spheres of expertise in decision making;
compromise; and accident.141 To this list I would add an interest in
constraining or slowing down presidential action, which is evident in the
recent Syria and Republic of Korea bills I discuss in the end of this
Subsection.142
Since 2017, Congress has used the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) to limit the President’s ability to conduct bilateral military
operations with Russia through fact-finding conditions placed jointly on
the Secretaries of Defense and State. Specifically, the statute conditions
funding for such bilateral operations on a certification by the Secretary of
Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, that

138 Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act, Pub. L.
No. 100-526, § 202, 102 Stat. 2623, 2627 (1988).
139 Id. §§ 202, 208.
140 Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 Harv.
L. Rev. 1131, 1145 (2012).
141 Id. at 1138–43.
142 Professor Bijal Shah considers and classifies congressional mechanisms to force
interagency coordination for a range of purposes, including constraint of the President, in an
excellent article, Congress’s Agency Coordination. See 103 Minn. L. Rev. 1961, 2035–36
(2019).
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(1) the Russian Federation has ceased its occupation of Ukrainian
territory and its aggressive activities that threaten the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Ukraine and members of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization; and
(2) the Russian Federation is abiding by the terms of and taking steps
in support of the Minsk Protocols regarding a ceasefire in eastern
Ukraine.143

Similarly, Congress recently added to the Defense Appropriations Act
a delegation to the United States Cyber Command of the power to
undertake proportionate defensive cyber operations against Russia,
contingent on “the National Command Authority determin[ing] that the
Russian Federation . . . is conducting an active, systematic, and ongoing
campaign of attacks against the Government or people of the United
States in cyberspace.”144 The National Command Authority is comprised
of the President and the Secretary of Defense, and thus a delegation
contingent on its determination appears to dilute the delegation of power,
at least as compared to a delegation to the President alone.145 The
ostensible purpose here is to facilitate the Defense Department’s ability
to undertake these kinds of defensive cyber operations, and the inclusion
of the Secretary of Defense as a necessary component of the
determination of Russian activity would seem designed to assist in that
endeavor. This may well operate to facilitate action in practice, depending
on the process the Secretary of Defense and the President have for making
National Command Authority decisions. But as a general matter, a
mechanism of joint control such as this one, as compared to a delegation
to the President alone, could have the effect of constraining action, as it
positions the Secretary of Defense as a statutory hurdle to action.

143

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328,
§ 1232(a), 130 Stat. 2000, 2488 (2016) (amended 2018, 2019). The NDAA 2019 includes a
carve-out for “bilateral military-to-military dialogue between the United States and the
Russian Federation for the purpose of reducing the risk of conflict.” John S. McCain National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, § 1247(b)(2), 132 Stat.
1636, 2050–51 (2018).
144 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act § 1642(a)(1).
145 See Robert Chesney, The Law of Military Cyber Operations and the New NDAA,
Lawfare (July 26, 2018, 2:07 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/law-military-cyberoperations-and-new-ndaa [https://perma.cc/T5TC-S2LY] (taking note of this designation to
the “NCA as opposed to just the president” as “[v]ery interesting”).
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Recently, a spate of proposed bills have sought to engage this process
control as a means of effectuating a particular policy. In 2018 and 2019,
several senators introduced bills to engage several national security
agencies in the decision-making process for new sanctions on Russia over
its election interference. Senators Marco Rubio and Chris Van Hollen
twice proposed a bill—titled the DETER Act—that would place the
critical trigger over foreign state sanctions in the hands of the Director of
National Intelligence and other intelligence officials—and quite pointedly
not the President.146 The proposed bill would trigger a requirement that
the President—through the Treasury Secretary—impose sanctions on
Russia or any other State should the Director of National Intelligence (“in
consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Director of the National Security Agency, [and] the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency”) make a finding that the State has interfered
in American elections.147 Unlike the cyber operations provisions of the
NDAA, which simply grant authority conditioned on the finding of the
National Command Authority, the DETER Act would require action,
conditioned on the Director of National Intelligence’s finding of fact.148
And in January 2019, a bipartisan group in the House introduced two
bills aimed at preventing the President from withdrawing troops from the
Republic of Korea and Syria through funding limitations.149 Neither bill
would require that the President keep troops in either Syria or the Korean
Peninsula. Instead, each would make funding contingent on executive
branch officials meeting certain procedural obligations.150 The Syria bill
would prohibit the use of funds to withdraw troops from Syria unless the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Director of National
Intelligence submit a report to Congress answering sixteen onerous

146

Defending Elections from Threats by Establishing Redlines Act of 2019, S. 1060, 116th
Cong. § 202(a) (2019); Defending Elections from Threats by Establishing Redlines Act of
2018, S. 2313, 115th Cong. § 201(a) (2018).
147 Defending Elections from Threats by Establishing Redlines Act of 2019 §§ 101(a),
202(a).
148 Id. § 202(a) (stating “[i]f the Director of National Intelligence determines under section
101 that the Government of the Russian Federation . . . knowingly engaged in interference in
a United States election, the President shall, not later than 30 days after such determination is
made, impose the following sanctions”).
149 Responsible Withdrawal from Syria Act, H.R. 914, 116th Cong. (2019); United States
and Republic of Korea Alliance Support Act, H.R. 889, 116th Cong. (2019).
150 Responsible Withdrawal from Syria Act § 2(a); United States and Republic of Korea
Alliance Support Act § 2(b).
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questions about the state of affairs in Syria.151 The Republic of Korea bill
is far more aggressive: it prohibits the use of funds to withdraw troops
from the Korean Peninsula unless the Secretary of Defense and Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff certify, inter alia, that “the Republic of Korea
would be fully capable of defending itself and deterring a conflict on the
Korean Peninsula following such a reduction.”152 Should they pass, these
would undoubtedly face some pushback from the President as infringing
on his commander-in-chief authority, which I discuss further below.153
But historically, Presidents have often chosen to comply with procedural
requirements despite raising separation-of-powers concerns, even when
such requirements pose a hurdle to their policy agenda.154
5. Implicit Allocations of Decision-Making Power
In addition to direct, targeted designations of specific deciders,
Congress also allocates decision-making authority inside the executive
branch implicitly, to unnamed administrators whose work product is
required by the terms of the statute. When Congress premises a statutory
delegation of power to the President or head of an agency on the condition
that certain procedures be followed, facts found, or reports provided to
Congress, this implicitly necessitates the involvement of certain types of
actors within the executive branch, namely: experts, professionals,
technocrats, and lawyers.155 The expert class of officials within the
executive branch is typically made up of non-politically-appointed civil
servants, operating around the middle tiers of the executive branch
151

Responsible Withdrawal from Syria Act § 2(a)(1)–(16).
United States and Republic of Korea Alliance Support Act § 2(b)(2)(C).
153
See infra Subsection III.C.1.
154 See infra notes 182–83 and accompanying text (discussing President Obama’s nearly
perfect compliance with the Guantanamo certification requirements, which he had critiqued
in a signing statement as potentially raising separation-of-powers concerns); see also Matthew
C. Weed, Cong. Research Serv., R42699, The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice
(2019) (summary) (collecting instances of presidential statements that stated that the President
was acting “consistent with” the War Powers Resolution, and finding that “Presidents have
submitted 168 reports as the result of the War Powers Resolution, but only one . . . cited
Section 4(a)(1), which triggers the 60-day withdrawal requirement”).
155 See McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 47, at 244 (“[P]rocedures can be used to
enfranchise important constituents in agency decisionmaking processes, thereby assuring that
agencies are responsive to their interests.”). Professors Elizabeth Magill and Adrian Vermeule
have written about a similar effect on executive branch decision making of judicial doctrines
and process requirements, although their focus was on these doctrines’ “upward” allocation
of power within agencies. See Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within
Agencies, 120 Yale L.J. 1032, 1061–62 (2011).
152
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bureaucracy.156 Their role is essential to adequately carrying out process
requirements like fact-finding or reporting to Congress. Thus, even
without explicitly naming an office or official in its delegation of power,
Congress can influence the organization of decision making inside the
executive branch by legislating process requirements.
Statutory requirements that executive branch officials engage in
particular processes, or find specific facts, or explain their actions before
acting fall within the “administrative procedures” category I discuss
above.157 But they are also a vehicle through which Congress can
designate deciders by steering power away from the President and toward
lower-level officials, even while delegating it to, or accepting its use by,
the executive branch as a whole.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF CONGRESSIONAL ADMINISTRATION
Congressional influence on foreign affairs through the administration
of executive branch decision making has numerous implications—for
Congress’s ability to influence foreign policy, for transparency and
accountability of foreign policy decisions, for the extent to which the
President is in fact bound by law—and it can be judged according to each
of these criteria.
When considering these implications and the value of process controls,
one must weigh them against the actual alternatives, taking into account
the potential for their realization. These alternatives include, on the one
hand, more direct involvement of Congress, such as through direct
substantive efforts to legislate policy, or, on the other hand, an even
starker abdication of influence to the President. Congressional
administration can be weighed against those alternatives on two levels: as
a descriptive matter (why might members of Congress prefer these forms
of engagement to the alternatives) and as a more normative one (whether
these forms are advantageous as a matter of policy and whether they raise
different or fewer constitutional issues).

156 Daniel P. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks,
and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862–1928, at 19–20 (2001); Magill &
Vermeule, supra note 155, at 1067.
157 See supra Part II.
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A. Why Deploy Process Controls to Influence Foreign Policy
There are many reasons members of Congress might turn to process
controls to influence policy short of mandating its substance. Targeted
process controls may permit members of Congress to push past hurdles
that would otherwise impede action. They may provide a means of
resolving conflicts or promoting a policy that could not be addressed or
passed through substantive legislation. At times process controls may
even be more efficacious in influencing policy than would substantive
legislation seeking to mandate it directly. I explore these reasons in
further detail in this Section.
1. Why Do Process Controls Surmount Congressional Reticence?
There are numerous reasons Congress does not take full advantage of
its foreign affairs power. Some may be based in genuine concern about
the relative institutional competence of Congress in this realm as against
the executive branch. Such concerns may be based on a belief that the
United States should speak with one voice and that voice should be the
President’s, or deference to the executive branch’s relative expertise,
access to information, and dispatch. For reasons of expediency and good
government, including the interest in presenting a unified United States
foreign policy to the world, members of Congress might reasonably take
the view that the President and the executive branch are best placed to
control foreign policy decision making.
Of course, history suggests that these concerns are not sufficient to
compel Congress to sit it out entirely. There have been multiple occasions
when members of Congress—both through duly enacted legislation and
through separate individual or small group action—have sought to press
their own foreign policy objectives. Moreover, they have done so not only
when the President has hesitated to act himself, but even in the face of the
President’s clear, contrary foreign policy goals. Congress’s attempt to
legislate U.S. recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel is one such
example.158 For a non-legislative attempt to interfere with the President’s
foreign policy agenda, consider the “Open Letter to the Leaders of the

158 See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2082–84 (2015) (discussing Congress’s
attempt to grant a right to have a person’s place of birth listed as “Jerusalem, Israel,” despite
the executive branch’s longstanding policy not to acknowledge any nation’s sovereignty over
Jerusalem).
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Islamic Republic of Iran,” signed by forty-seven Republican senators,
opposing President Obama’s Iran nuclear deal.159
I see no separation-of-powers rationale for distinguishing between
these and other foreign policy decisions in which Congress chooses not
to challenge the President’s agenda. Rather, the distinction is likely to be
a political one. In these limited examples, members of Congress found a
political advantage to a foreign policy showdown with the President, and
little disadvantage. More often, however, there are significant political
reasons that Congress declines to take a strong stand in the foreign policy
arena. When one or both houses of Congress are held by the same political
party as the President, members may find it politically unsavory or
inopportune to challenge him generally, especially on foreign policy.160
And even when opposing parties control both the House and Senate,
members may find it more politically useful to be able to criticize the
President’s choices than to own a particular foreign policy themselves.
They may find that their constituents are not as interested in questions of
foreign policy vis-à-vis domestic, and therefore that there is little to be
gained politically by engaging directly in this space.161 Congressional
abdication on foreign policy matters may also have a self-fulfilling,
snowballing effect that connects back up to institutional reasons for
abdication: as members of Congress sit out major debates on war and
foreign policy, they lose (or fail to gain) expertise in these realms. And as
Congress has fallen back on foreign policy, the executive branch has been
more than willing to fill the void.
Whatever the reason for congressional timidity in the foreign policy
realm, congressional administration through process controls provides an
alternate vehicle to facilitate congressional influence in this realm, which
may avoid some of the stumbling blocks that otherwise hold Congress
back.
First, unlike mandating substance directly, shaping foreign policy
through the use of process controls enables Congress to exploit, rather
159

Letter From Senate Republicans to the Leaders of Iran, N.Y. Times (Mar. 9, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/09/world/middleeast/document-the-letter-senate-republicans-addressed-to-the-leaders-of-iran.html?_r=1&module=inline [https://perma.cc/NW4P-WJCJ].
160 See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 Harv.
L. Rev. 2311, 2352 (2006).
161 See, e.g., Howell & Pevehouse, supra note 35, at 193 (“[M]ost citizens, most of the time,
come to foreign policy discussions with fewer well-defined and independently formulated
prior beliefs than they do to domestic policy debates . . . .”).
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than undermine, the advantages in the foreign policy realm that the
executive holds over Congress, such as expertise and access to
information. As with other areas of policy making, Congress may quite
reasonably acknowledge that it is not—at least as it has evolved—capable
of tackling the enormity and complexity of all decisions that the executive
branch bureaucracy undertakes.162 Process controls thus permit Congress
to influence the shape of decisions while benefiting from the vastness and
complexity of the bureaucracy, and with it executive branch expertise,
information, expediency, and flexibility.
Second, congressional use of process controls may permit members of
Congress to influence policy without necessarily damaging the United
States’ ability to speak with “one voice” in foreign affairs. While that “one
voice” may presumptively be the President’s, in practice, it has always
been the result of executive branch deliberation more broadly.163 That
Congress may influence the internal dynamics that result in that position
does not necessarily undercut the President’s stature abroad as the
expected mouthpiece for the U.S. government.
Third, it may be easier for proponents of a measure to obtain votes on
a bill including a process control than on one compelling a particular
substantive policy. Process controls are often attached to broader
legislative packages on which members are voting, potentially creating an
opt-out versus an opt-in scenario for choosing whether to support the
bill.164 Moreover, process controls may appear more “neutral” than
substantive legislation.165 Whereas a substantive provision may engender
sufficient support to compel members to vote against it, a process control
will be less likely to be a make-or-break component of the bill.166
162
McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 47, at 254 (“[A]n important function of
administrative procedures is to provide a means of inducing bureaucratic compliance that does
not require the time, effort, and resources of political actors.”).
163 See Henkin, supra note 32, at 41–42.
164 For example, Congress has embedded process controls in recent National Defense
Authorization Acts, forcing members of Congress to choose between voting for the provisions
and voting against funding the military. See, e.g., Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 1033(a), (b)(5), 124 Stat. 4137, 4351–52
(2011).
165 See Lindsay & Ripley, supra note 53, at 28 (“[T]he ‘ostensibly neutral’ character of
procedure makes it easier to build a winning coalition around procedural changes than around
substantive policy changes.”).
166 See, e.g., David Manners-Weber, Comment, Certification as Sabotage: Lessons from
Guantánamo Bay, 127 Yale L.J. 1416, 1442–44 (2018) (discussing interviews with several
members of Congress that suggest they voted for process controls that would effectuate a
policy that they would not have supported); Dara Lind, Republicans Have Obama in a Corner
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Finally, process controls give members of Congress a means of pushing
back against a President even when it could be politically costly to do so
more directly.167 Adding process requirements to a statutory grant of
power or designating a particularly trusted executive branch official as
the decision maker on a specific grant of authority is hardly as headlinegrabbing or as conflict-creating as openly legislating a policy contrary to
the President’s. Moreover, process controls typically leave the politically
sensitive decisions in the hands of bureaucrats—whether lower-level
technocrats or high-level heads of agencies—permitting members of
Congress to avoid or even deny responsibility for the resulting policy
should it fail or prove unpopular. Whether the process control delegates
to technocrats or to the head of an agency, it permits members of Congress
to shift the political costs of decision making to the executive branch,
while still retaining some influence over the policy.
2. Process Controls and Purpose
Congressional deployment of process controls to influence foreign
policy may be motivated by diverse purposes. In fact, any given
mechanism of control may be driven by multiple, varied motivations
among the members of Congress who supported it.168 These motivations
on Syrian Refugees, Vox (Nov. 19, 2015, 2:06 PM), https://www.vox.com/2015/11/19/9762054/congress-obama-refugees-syria [https://perma.cc/4KQ3-MFNY] (calling a bill that
would slow the process of accepting refugees by requiring certifications by high-level
administration officials “anodyne enough that it’s attracted broad support from congressional
Democrats as well as Republicans”).
167 For a recent example of this effort, see Defending Elections from Threats by Establishing
Redlines Act of 2019, S. 1060, 116th Cong. (2019) (bipartisan bill co-sponsored by Sen.
Marco Rubio “[t]o deter foreign interference in United States elections”). For anecdotal
evidence that congressional members of the same party as the President might not be aware
of the potential effects of a given process control, allowing sponsors to pick up votes they
might not get with more direct approaches, see Jennifer Steinhauer & Michael D. Shear, House
Approves Tougher Refugee Screening, Defying Veto Threat, N.Y. Times (Nov. 19, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/20/us/politics/house-refugees-syria-iraq.html
[https://perma.cc/22MS-QMLC] (noting that during debates over certification requirements
for Syrian refugees, in the face of attempts by then-President Obama to sway Democratic
congressional members to vote against the requirements as adding unnecessary hurdles to an
already rigorous vetting process, Democratic Representative Sean Patrick Maloney stated, “I
started out strongly opposed to [the bill]. . . . But then I read the bill and realized that what it
actually required was simple certification”).
168 Of course, it is not always clear the extent to which members of Congress support
particular process controls for a given purpose. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz
Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional
Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901, 943, 989 (2013) (revealing
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may include mistrust of the President, conflicting views over the preferred
policy objective, or an interest in avoiding political costs for a necessary
action.
Process control measures deployed for the purpose of promoting a
preferred policy objective may involve a shift of decision maker to an
agency or office likely to press policy objectives in line with those of
members of Congress, such as the statutory mandate that the Secretary of
Defense certify the lack of threat for all transfers out of Guantanamo.169
Similarly, recent interest in transferring to the Secretary of Defense
authority over the Section 232 national security justification for tariffs
appears to be motivated by a desire to minimize the use of that
exception.170
Measures intended to depoliticize decision making or to advance
particular expertise will typically allocate power downward, toward
career officials and technocrats within the agency, or to an appointed
bipartisan commission, rather than toward the President or his direct
appointees.171 Congress’s creation of a nonpartisan commission to issue
military base closure recommendations fulfilled this purpose by taking
the political heat off members of Congress, who found votes to close
military bases highly unpopular among constituents who would be
affected by the loss of jobs and resources.172
And measures to combat a lack of trust in the President—whether
based on suspicion of corruption or doubts about his judgment in a given
area—may deploy any of the above, depending on the extent to which
other actors within the executive branch inspire greater confidence. The
DETER Act bill discussed above is a prime example; if passed, it would
make the Director of National Intelligence (not the President) the arbiter
of whether Russia was interfering in U.S. elections, thus triggering the
sanctions in the bill.173 This would permit Congress and the country to
the breadth of motivations and procedural causes behind statutory drafting and the delta
between knowledge among the drafters of statutes and assumptions about congressional
intent); see also Shepsle, supra note 62, at 248 (discussing the various reasons for legislative
preferences, including personal taste, ideology, responsibility to constituents, responsibility to
donors, etc.).
169 See supra Subsection II.C.1 (discussing Guantanamo transfer restrictions).
170 See supra Subsection II.C.2 (discussing the multiple historical shifts in authority over the
Section 232 justification and recent attempts to shift it again).
171 See supra Subsection II.C.3 (discussing the creation of an executive branch-based
commission to issue recommendations on military base closures).
172 See supra Subsection II.C.3.
173 See supra Subsection II.C.4 (discussing the DETER Act).
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benefit from the expertise and access to information of the executive
branch intelligence agencies, while simultaneously taking some policymaking power away from a President whose motivations in this realm
many, including quite possibly the members of his own party who support
the bill, have come to suspect. And it would do so without implicating
concerns of a so-called “deep state” seeking power at the expense of
elected leadership, because the policy objective would come from
Congress itself.
B. Efficacy of Congressional Administration
So does congressional administration in fact influence the shape of
foreign policy decision making, or is Congress just rearranging deck
chairs on a ship the President will sail in whichever direction he likes?
While administrative procedures and agency design are often held out as
tools of bureaucratic control, clear accounts of the extent to which these
controls are effective, and at producing what particular purpose, are
rare.174 The few scholars who have considered the role of specific
administrative procedures in influencing foreign policy have taken
opposing views on their efficacy.175
This Section considers the efficacy of process controls—and
specifically the choice of decider measures that I discuss in Section II.C—
in light of the various purposes for which they might be deployed. This is
not an extensive survey of results, nor is it a demonstration of efficacy.
Such a study would be worthwhile though complicated; while numerous
examples exist in which process controls correlate with a result that
accords with purposes I describe above, the reasons for a particular
outcome may be overdetermined. There is the problem of “observational
equivalence” akin to that faced by scholars seeking to demonstrate that
the President makes decisions constrained by law and not policy

174

See, e.g., Berry & Gersen, supra note 51, at 1009, 1038–39 (using bureaucratic decisions
to allocate appropriated funds to measure the political responsiveness of agencies based on
design, and finding the common belief—that deploying political appointments throughout an
agency makes them more politically responsive—to be consistent with their results).
175 See, e.g., Chinen, supra note 80, at 235 (arguing that “certification requirements are not
particularly effective in controlling executive behavior”). But see Manners-Weber, supra note
166, passim (arguing that certification requirements can be effective, and that specifically, the
Guantanamo certification requirements created an obstacle to Obama closing the detention
facility).
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preferences that happen to accord with law.176 Furthermore, any given
process control itself may be motivated by multiple purposes.
Nevertheless, it is possible to deduce from understandings of the inner
working of executive branch bureaucracy how the various process
controls I describe above may interact with internal levers of decision
making, and thus the types of influence they are likely to exert, and why,
if not whether, they will in each event result in a change of outcome. I
thus examine here the features of congressional administration and
contextual factors that are relevant to the inquiry.
1. The State of Play Inside the Executive Branch
The state of agreement or conflict inside the executive branch on a
particular matter of foreign policy or national security affects the extent
to which opportunities exist for congressional administration to influence
executive decision making. Foreign policy and national security are fields
that engage many different agencies and executive branch offices, with
overlapping jurisdictions and often conflicting mandates and biases.177
These complexities provide opportunities for influencing outcomes by
changing decision-making processes, responsibilities, and authority.
To the extent key actors on the inside are all on one page, and that page
is the President’s, there are few pressure points for members of Congress
to manipulate to do their bidding. Happily for Congress, such extreme
agreement among all components of the executive branch is rare. Often
on matters of foreign policy and national security there exist serious
policy differences either between different agencies or personalities—or
both—and the process of decision making inside the executive branch can
have a considerable effect on the outcome, in large part because that
process affects the weight afforded particular decision makers and who
will be the ultimate “decider.”178 In prior work, I have discussed how
triggers outside of the executive branch can influence that process and the
authority of particular internal “deciders,” and thus can help shape the

176 See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice,
and Legal Constraint, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1097, 1114 (2013).
177 See, e.g., Neomi Rao, Public Choice and International Law Compliance: The Executive
Branch Is a “They,” Not an “It,” 96 Minn. L. Rev. 194, 199–200 (2011) (discussing the
“divergent interests” of the “number of legal departments [with] responsibility for
international law interpretation”); see also Freeman & Rossi, supra note 140, at 1176
(describing a “multilevel interagency process” in the national security and defense contexts).
178 See, e.g., Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts, supra note 19, passim.
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ultimate outcomes.179 Congress has more power than most to influence
that process, and thus, congressional engagement to place a thumb on the
scale of one side can have a significant effect on the resulting outcome.
For example, in the case of the Guantanamo transfer restrictions,
members of Congress had reason to believe that the Department of
Defense, and specifically the Secretary of Defense, would be more
reluctant to approve transfers than others within the executive branch,
such as the Secretary of State. The reasons for that belief were plentiful:
unlike the other relevant decision makers, the Defense Secretary hailed
from the President’s opposing political party, and the Department of
Defense was understood to harbor a significant amount of dissent inside
the building (though not universal dissent) regarding the President’s plan
to shutter the Guantanamo detention facilities.180 Members of Congress
also hoping to slow Guantanamo closure had their own channels to actors
within the Defense Department, and thus were surely aware of internal
executive branch conflict over detention questions.181
Delegating the requirement to the Secretary of Defense to certify
transfers privileged the position of the Department of Defense in those
internal debates with the rest of the executive branch. And even though
President Obama signed the Act containing the certification requirements
with an accompanying signing statement questioning their constitutionality,182 he nevertheless continued to comply—through the Secretary of

179

Id.
See, e.g., Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance, supra note 52, at 210–14 (discussing
resistance within the Department of Defense to the President’s plan to shutter the detention
facilities at Guantanamo).
181 See, e.g., Charles Levinson & David Rohde, Special Report: Pentagon Thwarts Obama’s
Effort to Close Guantanamo, Reuters (Dec. 29, 2015, 5:20 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-gitmo-release-special-report-idUSKBN0UB1B020151229 [https://perma.cc/WA5G-X5QY ] (noting friction within the Department of Defense); Rebecca Shabad, Report:
Pentagon Officials Have Slowed Process to Close Gitmo, CBS News (Dec. 28, 2015, 5:33
PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/report-pentagon-officials-have-slowed-process-to-close-gitmo/ [https://perma.cc/7LWS-RZUF].
182 See, e.g., Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement by the
President on H.R. 2055 (Dec. 23, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/12/23/statement-president-hr-2055 [https://perma.cc/EK6G-K5U5] (stating that
“Congress has also included certain provisions in this bill that could interfere with my
constitutional authorities in the areas of foreign relations and national security” and that “I
will apply these provisions in a manner consistent with my constitutional authority as
Commander in Chief”).
180
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Defense—with the reporting and certification requirements.183 The result
of the new certification requirements was that transfers out of
Guantanamo ground almost to a halt in the aftermath of the legislation.184
There appear to be similar dynamics at play with the proposed
swapping of decision makers over the Section 232 exceptions to tariff
rules. Here, again, the President and some members of his cabinet seem
inclined toward action—in this case the imposition of significant tariffs
on foreign imports across the board—and the former Defense Secretary,
James Mattis, was believed to hold views closer to that of many members
of Congress, who did not want to see such extreme tariffs imposed
broadly.185 Members of Congress have had reason to believe, in part due
to his own memorandum to this effect, that the former Secretary of
Defense, and later after his departure, the Department generally, would
be less inclined to certify a national security justification for imposing
tariffs than was the Secretary of Commerce. They have thus made a
number of attempts to move the authority from the latter to the former.186
Congressional reliance on internal tensions may take a short or long
view. While any given statutory designation is likely to outlast particular
appointees, who come and go quite regularly, interagency tensions are
often longstanding and survive administration to administration, and thus
specific designations may continue to operate as intended beyond the
lifespan of a particular appointee.187 Nevertheless, priorities and

183 The only exception was the transfer of five Guantanamo detainees in exchange for Bowe
Bergdahl. See U.S. Dep’t of Def. Press Operations, Statement on the Transfer of Detainees
Before the House Armed Servs. Comm. (June 11, 2014) (delivered by Sec’y of Def. Chuck
Hagel) (acknowledging that the transfer occurred without the thirty-day notice required by the
statute, but stating that “[t]he President has constitutional responsibilities and constitutional
authorities to protect American citizens and members of our armed forces”).
184 See Manners-Weber, supra note 166, at 1424.
185 Letter from Mattis to Ross, supra note 4.
186 See generally Promoting Responsible and Free Trade Act of 2019, H.R. 3673, 116th
Cong. (2019) (requiring “congressional approval of certain trade remedies”); Trade Security
Act of 2019, S. 365, 116th Cong. (2019) (“To amend section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act
of 1962 to require the Secretary of Defense to initiate investigations and to provide for
congressional disapproval of certain actions . . . .”); Bicameral Congressional Trade Authority
Act of 2019, S. 287, 116th Cong (2019); Promoting Responsible and Free Trade Act, H.R.
6923, 115th Cong. (2018) (requiring “congressional approval of certain trade remedies”);
Trade Security Act of 2018, S. 3329, 115th Cong. (2018) (“To amend section 232 of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962 to require the Secretary of Defense to initiate investigations and to
provide for congressional disapproval of certain actions . . . .”).
187 Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance, supra note 52, at 162–63, 168–69; see Press Release,
Sen. Rob Portman, supra note 11; see also Rao, supra note 177.
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preferences do shift over time, agency mandates are reorganized, and
offices are brought closer to or further from the White House from
administration to administration; thus, as with the shifting designations
over Section 232 justifications for tariffs, members of Congress may find
it useful to shift agency deciders when the current structure no longer
comports with their intentions in creating it.
2. Process Controls: Formal or Functional Barriers?
A potential challenge to my account of process controls as an effective
means of constraining or compelling presidential action is the argument
that executive branch actors ultimately report to the President and must
do his bidding. Designating a decider within the executive branch may
create some paperwork requirements but should not—under this view—
affect the actual policy result, because that is the President’s to decide.
Whether or not this reflects the formal breakdown of power within the
executive branch (and I do not accept that it does, certainly not for all or
even most executive branch exercises of power), it does not describe the
functional reality, in which decision-making power and process have a
significant, if not always dispositive, role in the path of policy making.
Most of the examples of congressional administration I discuss in this
paper involve allocations of power to officials over which the President
exercises direct removal authority. Scholars differ on the extent to which
the removal power is a sufficient political control over bureaucratic
autonomy. Under Elena Kagan’s view of “Presidential Administration,”
the President’s authority implicitly extends to directing these officials to
take a particular action even if it does not accord with their own views.188
Their delegated authority is, in other words, really the President’s.189
Professor Gary Lawson goes several steps further, arguing that the
President should have the power to nullify the acts of subordinates.190
Professor Kevin Stack takes an opposing view, arguing that the President

188

See Kagan, supra note 13, at 2326–28 (arguing that while the Constitution does not
require that the President be able to direct all authority delegated to administrative officials,
statutory delegations to such officials, outside of independent agencies, should generally be
interpreted as “subject to the ultimate control of the President”).
189 Id. at 2328.
190 Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1231,
1244 (1994).
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does not have authority to direct subordinates in cases where statutes
delegate executive power to them specifically.191
Even accepting arguendo the most aggressive view of presidential
power over subordinates’ decisions as a matter of formal authority—and
I do not—as a functional matter, process and structure shape decision
making and add hurdles, if not barriers, to the President’s ability to
effectuate his preferred policies.192 Consider one glaring example: the
President’s oft-stated desire during the first half of the Trump
administration to end the Russia investigation run first by the FBI under
James Comey, and then by the Special Counsel, Robert Mueller.193 If the
investigation were under his direct, immediate control, it is probably fair
to say there can be no doubt that he would have ended or severely
compromised it.194 But this was not within his immediate power, because
the investigation was designed to be situated several steps of personnel
removed from the President’s control.195 In his efforts to end the
investigation, he removed some officials, such as FBI Director James
191

Kevin M. Stack, The President's Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 Colum.
L. Rev. 263, 267 (2006).
192 Kagan herself acknowledges this practical reality. See Kagan, supra note 13, at 2298
(“Their resistance to or mere criticism of a directive may inflict political costs on the President
as heavy as any that would result from an exercise of the removal power. This fact of political
life accounts in part for the consultations and compromises that prefaced many of the Clinton
White House’s uses of directive authority. In this context, to put the matter simply, persuasion
may be more than persuasion and command may be less than command—making the line
between the two sometimes hard to discover.”).
193 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Aug. 15, 2018, 7:08 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1029731513573822464 [https://perma.cc/MUS6-3HXW] (“The Rigged Russian Witch Hunt goes on and on as the “originators and founders”
of this scam continue to be fired and demoted for their corrupt and illegal activity. All
credibility is gone from this terrible Hoax, and much more will be lost as it proceeds. No
Collusion!”); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Nov. 29, 2018, 4:16 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1068116413498429445 [https://perma.cc/H875WTP3] (“When will this illegal Joseph McCarthy style Witch Hunt, one that has shattered so
many innocent lives, ever end-or will it just go on forever? After wasting more than
$40,000,000 (is that possible?), it has proven only one thing-there was NO Collusion with
Russia. So Ridiculous!”); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Aug. 1, 2018, 6:24
AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1024646945640525826 [https://perma.cc/VA23-7D9B] (“..This is a terrible situation and Attorney General Jeff Sessions should stop
this Rigged Witch Hunt right now, before it continues to stain our country any further. Bob
Mueller is totally conflicted, and his 17 Angry Democrats that are doing his dirty work are a
disgrace to USA!”).
194 See supra note 193.
195 The regulations governing the special counsel do set the investigation at some remove
from the President, but as they are created by executive order and not statute, the President
holds formal authority to change them. See 28 C.F.R. § 600.9 (2018).
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Comey and, eventually, Attorney General Jeff Sessions.196 But he failed
to remove others, such as the Deputy Attorney General, Rod Rosenstein,
and Robert Mueller himself, in time to stop the investigation.197 Each
removal had, or was delayed by, political repercussions, despite the fact
that each removal was within his formal authority to effectuate.198 And
yet he was stymied in his efforts to end the investigation, not primarily by
formal legal constraints, though in this case there may also exist some,
but by the political hurdles of what ending the investigation would entail
and require—likely firing each official who refused to end the
investigation until he were to find someone who would.199 Thus some
officials left, but Rosenstein remained to the end, along with his decisions
to commence and to protect the inquiry, despite the fact that the President
would not have made those decisions himself. Wherever the formal line
is drawn with respect to presidential control over executive branch
personnel, presidential control through appointment and removal is
hardly equivalent as a functional matter to presidential control over the
decision itself.

2 Robert S. Mueller, III, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Report on the Investigation into Russian
Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election 66–68, 107–111 (2019) [hereinafter Mueller
Report] (outlining the timelines behind the President’s decisions to have FBI Director James
Comey and Attorney General Jeff Sessions fired).
197 Id. at 78, 88–89 (discussing the President’s attempts to have the White House Counsel,
Don McGahn, fire Robert Mueller and thus terminate the investigation).
198 This is not to say that there are no formal constraints on removal; for example, the
President may be subject to constraints on his ability to obstruct justice as a matter of law (if
not one addressable by courts at this time), which could constrain his formal authority to fire
law enforcement officials for particular purposes. See generally Daniel J. Hemel & Eric A.
Posner, Presidential Obstruction of Justice, 106 Calif. L. Rev. 1277 (2018) (arguing that the
President may be held criminally liable for obstructing justice through the corrupt exercise of
constitutional powers); Mueller Report, supra note 195, at 1–2 (stating that the investigation
was constrained by the 2000 Office of Legal Counsel opinion that states the President cannot
be prosecuted for criminal offenses while in office).
199 It is generally understood that Nixon’s “Saturday Night Massacre” series of firings and
resignations of Department of Justice (DOJ) officials precipitated his fall. See, e.g., Ron
Elving, Nixon’s Saturday Night Massacre Casts Shadow as Trump Considers Fate of DOJ
Leaders, NPR (Oct. 20, 2018, 7:15 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/20/659032303/nixonssaturday-night-massacre-casts-shadow-as-trump-considers-fate-of-doj-leade [https://perma.cc/FV4E-ZK4H] (pointing to the firings as a cause of his resignation); Amy B. Wang, The
Saturday Night Massacre: ‘Your Commander in Chief Has Given You an Order,’ Wash. Post
(May 11, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2017/05/11/thesaturday-night-massacre-your-commander-in-chief-has-given-you-an-order/?utm_term=.77268fd3eadc [https://perma.cc/ZX5S-CT42] (same).
196
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3. Harnessing of Accountability Mechanisms
One of the more effective uses of process controls is the placement of
public responsibility for a decision directly in the hands of a particular
official, who will thus understand herself to be accountable for whichever
decision she chooses going forward. When this mechanism is combined
with a legal requirement—for example, to find facts or to certify that
certain factors are met—this accountability feature raises the stakes for
the designated individual choosing whether or not to comply with the
substantive legal requirements.
Moreover, a procedural requirement is often less open to interpretation
than, say, whether a particular strike qualifies as “war” and whether the
President can undertake it without congressional authorization. Presidents
tend to avoid actively asserting noncompliance with law, but they may
assert an interpretation that some find far-fetched.200 And the extent to
which a presidential claim is simply a different interpretation or beyond
the pale can be particularly hard to police in areas where the law is
ambiguous, fraught, or evolving. By contrast, a requirement that the
Secretary of Defense sign a piece of paper with specific language or
produce a report to Congress provides a much simpler metric by which to
judge compliance or non-compliance with law.
By engaging with foreign policy through process controls, Congress
enlists these internal actors themselves in its cause. It places the onus on
these individuals to decide for themselves whether to comply with or
disregard particular statutory obligations, removing their ability to hide
behind the President or behind collective action in determining whether a
statutory requirement must be followed or whether it is a plausible
justification to dismiss the requirement as an unconstitutional
encroachment on the President. And while Presidents may be protected to
some degree from certain kinds of accountability, such as criminal
prosecution while in office, lower-level officials have fewer
protections.201 Executive branch officials may face both hard and soft
forms of personal liability for lawbreaking: from criminal prosecution in
some cases, to inspector general or Government Accountability Office
200 See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 176, at 1114 (“It is rare for Presidents to
acknowledge that they are acting inconsistently with the law. Instead, they typically argue that
the law does not require what critics are contending.”).
201 Federal government officials do enjoy some immunity from civil liability for decisions
they make in their official capacity, but they are not protected for unambiguous lawbreaking.
See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
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(GAO) investigations, to congressional requests and even subpoenas to
testify and explain actions taken, to disbarment or other professional
censure, to public and professional embarrassment.202 As former Defense
Secretary Leon Panetta dramatically explained when pressed on his
record of not approving a single transfer out of Guantanamo under the
congressional certification requirements, “[T]hat provision required that
I sign my life away.”203 For these reasons and others, executive branch
officials who are designated deciders may be more inclined than the
President or unnamed groups of advisers or officials to comply carefully
with the letter of statutory requirements.
C. Risks in Congressional Administration
Congressional administration does not put to bed all debates about the
allocation of foreign affairs authority among the branches of the federal
government. In fact, precisely because congressional administration may
facilitate congressional involvement in areas where members might
otherwise choose to sit out, congressional influence over foreign policy
through process controls may provide the flashpoint for thorny
constitutional questions over the line between the President’s and
Congress’s authorities. Beyond these constitutional risks, there are
potential disadvantages to engaging foreign policy through congressional
administration. For example, deploying process controls may give
members of Congress a false sense of action, mollifying concerns about
the President’s policy direction or judgment and thus keeping Congress
from engaging in substantive policy debates more directly. And process
controls might at times undermine, rather than promote, accountability
for decision making.

202 Soldiers, for example, must be prosecuted and punished for violating the laws of war.
Federal officials face criminal sanction for violating the Anti-Deficiency Act. Agency
Inspectors General Offices investigate misconduct by federal employees. The Government
Accountability Office (GAO) is an independent agency that investigates wrongdoing on behalf
of Congress. See Overview, Gov’t Accountability Off., https://www.gao.gov/about/
[https://perma.cc/C3GE-36DN]. Congress also frequently calls executive branch officials to
testify in order to explain how their actions comport with statutory requirements. And
professional associations are often called upon to censure the actions of professionals accused
of acting unethically or otherwise outside the norms of the profession.
203 Bruck, supra note 100.
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1. Constitutional Risks in Congressional Administration
Congressional administration of foreign policy and national security
raises distinct constitutional issues from the rest of the administrative
state, depending on the extent to which a given exercise of control
approaches the debated zone between the President’s delegated statutory
authority and constitutional Article II power. While some level of
congressional involvement in the design and ongoing process of
executive branch decision making has a long, and executive branchaccepted, pedigree, the executive branch has long bristled at, and often
pushed back against, any congressional engagement that interferes with,
let alone “prevents,” a “constitutionally assigned function[].”204
Considering the sparseness of the text, “constitutionally assigned” may
seem a high bar; the Constitution explicitly assigns very little power to
the President alone. But the extent to which the President may trump
Congress in this space, if at all, is a matter of hot debate.205 And
congressional attempts to control policy through the bureaucracy itself
may raise similar constitutional dilemmas as attempts to dictate that
policy directly. Thus congressional involvement in the foreign affairs and
national security realms raises significantly thornier questions than
similar engagement with other parts of the administrative state, which rely
more exclusively and more clearly on delegated authority.206
Some examples may help set the lay of the land. Certainly, a
congressional attempt to constrain the President’s use of his pardon power
through, say, a requirement that the Attorney General certify that every
pardoned individual is sufficiently contrite, would be impermissible.207
The executive branch would likewise likely challenge as unlawful process
controls that executive branch officials perceive to be interfering with the

204

The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20 Op.
O.L.C. 124, 174–75 (1996) (citing Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)).
205 See supra note 25.
206 See Constitutional Separation of Powers, supra note 204, at 133 n.27 (“Legislation
impinging on the President’s responsibilities in the areas of foreign affairs and national
defense poses unique issues in the application of the general principle of separation of powers,
requiring a more searching examination of the validity of congressional action.”).
207 See Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974) (concluding that the pardon “power flows
from the Constitution alone, not from any legislative enactments, and that it cannot be
modified, abridged, or diminished by the Congress”). In fact, the federal regulations regulating
the pardon process for the executive branch themselves explicitly state that they are “advisory
only” and do not “restrict the authority granted to the President under Article II, section 2 of
the Constitution.” 28 C.F.R. § 1.11 (2018).
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President’s ability to exercise his commander-in-chief authority (although
the President might nevertheless comply).208 Yet the extent to which that
clause gives the President any plenary constitutional authority over war,
concurrent authority with Congress, or in fact very little non-delegated
authority at all, is controversial.209 While the Constitution makes the
President the “Commander in Chief,” it gives to Congress not only the
power to declare war but also the power to fund it and to make rules
governing the armed forces.210 A recent proposal by Professors Richard
Betts and Matthew Waxman to mandate certification by specific internal
actors, including a legal review by the Attorney General, before the
President may order the launch of a nuclear weapon raises precisely these
questions.211 So, too, it is far from clear whether the congressional
requirements that the Secretary of Defense certify Guantanamo transfers,
for example, present a constitutional conflict. President Obama suggested
as much in signing statements, and even at one point violated the statutory
prohibition, but otherwise complied.212 Neither matter would likely come
before the courts, and because of the executive branch’s general track
record of compliance with such requirements, both are examples of areas
where Congress might effectively rein in the President even without
necessarily running to ground the scope of their authority to do so.
Outside of the Commander in Chief Clause and the authority to appoint
and receive ambassadors, the President’s foreign policy dominance has
less clear sourcing, but the executive branch has long sought to claim and

208

U.S. Const. art. II, § 2; see supra note 204 and accompanying text.
See supra Section I.A.
210 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
211 Richard K. Betts & Matthew C. Waxman, The President and the Bomb: Reforming the
Nuclear Launch Process, 97 Foreign Aff. 119, 120 (2018).
212 See Presidential Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2014, 2013 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 876, 1 (Dec. 26, 2013) (stating that “in certain
circumstances, [the transfer restrictions] would violate constitutional separation of powers
principles”); News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Statement from Sec’y of Def. Chuck Hagel
on the Return of Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl (May 31, 2014), https://archive.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=16737 [https://perma.cc/ND5Y-KZKH]; Jack Goldsmith,
The President Pretty Clearly Disregarded a Congressional Statute in Swapping GTMO
Detainees for Bergdahl, Lawfare (June 2, 2014), https://www.lawfareblog.com/presidentpretty-clearly-disregarded-congressional-statute-swapping-gtmo-detainees-bergdahl
[https://perma.cc/8TYE-9674] (discussing the exchange of an American soldier for GTMO
detainees, in which the Secretary of Defense did not meet the thirty-day notification
requirement in the statute).
209
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protect it,213 often, though not always, successfully.214 Yet some areas—
such as international commerce—quite clearly lie within congressional
control and have been ceded to the executive only through progressive
statutory delegations.215 Congress could dial back the President’s
authority in these areas entirely, and thus the fact that it intervenes through
process controls rather than through substance should not create any
greater constitutional problems than engagement with other areas of the
administrative state.
It is also worth at least briefly noting here ongoing debates in
scholarship over the extent to which Congress may direct how the
executive branch executes the law, in particular, debates over the concept
of a “unitary executive.” In broad brushstrokes, unitary executive theory
holds that the President must wield all power vested in the executive
branch.216 What that means in practice, however, varies across different
versions of the theory.217 Congressional administration of the President’s
decision-making processes, and in particular the use of process controls
to designate and change deciders inside the executive, is in tension with
the more aggressive variants of unitary executive theory. Thus far, the
courts have broadly accepted congressional structuring of the executive
branch, but I discuss these debates here to explain how they would engage
with congressional administration of foreign policy.218

213 See Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994
and 1995, 1 Pub. Papers 807, 808 (Apr. 30, 1994) (noting that the President’s power “includes
special authority in the area of foreign affairs,” and that the President will “construe” any
provisions in the legislation that would interfere with those prerogatives as “precatory”).
214
See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084–85 (2015); Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi,
539 U.S. 396, 414–15 (2003). For dissections of the Court’s “normalization” of its foreign
policy jurisprudence, see Harlan Grant Cohen, Formalism and Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law
in the Roberts Court, 83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 380 (2015); Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth,
The Normalization of Foreign Affairs Law, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1897 (2015).
215 See supra notes 109–10.
216 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute
the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541 (1994).
217 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, A Political Perspective on the Theory of the Unitary Executive,
12 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 313, 313 (2010).
218 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508, 513–14
(2010) (upholding the constitutionality of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
but severing as unconstitutional the rule creating two layers of constraint on the board
members’ removal); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696–97 (1988); Humphrey’s Ex’r v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627–30 (1935) (upholding the constitutionality of independent
agencies); Kagan, supra note 13, at 2250–51.
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In its most aggressive form, a unitary executive theory might hold that
any formal constraints on a President’s ability to exercise executive
power—including through delegating that power to an official other than
the President—would pose an unconstitutional constraint.219 Of course,
that would mean the dismantling of most delegations of power to the
agencies making up the administrative state. The more widely held view
of the unitary executive, however, accepts the general structure of
administrative delegations to agency officials rather than to the
President.220 But such delegations are acceptable because, in their view,
presidential control of executive power is effectuated through the vesting
of final decision-making authority in the President or officials under his
or her control by way of removal. In effect, the argument goes, the
President must hold unfettered discretion to appoint and remove officials
who wield executive power. The courts have to date nevertheless upheld
Congress’s power to insulate certain agencies and officials from
presidential control.221 In any event, Congress has virtually never sought
to insulate the foreign policy or national security administration through
such restrictions on appointment or removal power.222
Here is where unitary executive theory could intersect with debates
about the proper allocation of foreign affairs and national security power
between the President and Congress. Might there be some distinction
between the kinds of agencies or powers Congress can insulate from
presidential control? Could Congress insulate executive branch actors in
their exercise of powers where the President holds some concurrent
authority with Congress, such as at least some foreign policy or national
security powers? Were Congress to seek to insulate certain actors or
decision-making processes from presidential control in areas where the
President has traditionally asserted Article II authority, such measures
could bring questions of both the viability of unitary executive theory and
the allocation of foreign affairs power to a head.
219 Tushnet, supra note 217, at 319. Professor Gary Lawson has argued further that the
President may have the power to nullify the acts of subordinates. See Lawson, supra note 190,
at 1244–45.
220 Tushnet, supra note 217, at 315–18 (describing what he terms the “weak” version of the
unitary executive).
221 See, e.g., Morrison, 487 U.S. at 659–60.
222 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 675–76; Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 630–32. One potential,
though narrow, exception could involve efforts by some in Congress to protect the Mueller
investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential campaign. See, e.g., Special
Counsel Independence and Integrity Act, S. 2644, 115th Cong. § 599K-8 (2018).
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Congressional attempts to manage the President’s foreign affairs and
national security decision making therefore could provide the next
flashpoint at which each of these constitutional questions arise in the
courts. This will likely turn on how aggressively Congress seeks to deploy
process controls to establish formal buffers between the President and
executive branch decision makers in areas where the President has
traditionally asserted independent or even plenary authority to act.
2. Mollification of Congress
One risk of deploying process controls is that—by giving members of
Congress a sense that they are controlling the decision-making process—
this may keep them from engaging further in the substance of policy
making. And on some matters, there is no substitute for direct
congressional—and through it, public—engagement with the substance
of policy making.
This phenomenon may be particularly prevalent when Congress
allocates power vertically down the hierarchy within the executive branch
to career professionals who are expected to deploy expertise at a remove
from partisan interference. In fact, members of Congress might be more
reticent to endorse grants of power to the President—in particular to
Presidents of the opposing party—were they not assured this power would
be partly wielded (and perhaps tempered) by nonpartisan professionals
within the government.223 And thus congressional delegations of this sort
should be understood as made in reliance upon existing bureaucratic
constraints. I have previously referred to this phenomenon as
congressional “bargain[ing] in the shadow of the bureaucracy.”224
Professor Jack Goldsmith and Susan Hennessey nodded toward such a
phenomenon in their discussion of the reauthorization of FISA Section
702.225 In response to criticism of Democratic lawmakers who voted to
See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 190, at 1245 (“Judging from the political conflict that is
often generated by disputes between Congress and the President, it is at least arguable that
Congress would never have granted agencies their current, almost-limitless powers if
Congress recognized that such power had to be directly under the control of the President.”).
224 Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance, supra note 52, at 179–81 (citing Robert H. Mnookin &
Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J.
950, 968–69 (1979)).
225 Jack Goldsmith & Susan Hennessey, The Merits of Supporting 702 Reauthorization
(Despite Worries About Trump and the Rule of Law), Lawfare (Jan. 18, 2018, 9:20 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/merits-supporting-702-reauthorization-despite-worries-abouttrump-and-rule-law [https://perma.cc/NV7Q-JNXD].
223
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reauthorize broad surveillance powers to the President while Trump held
the office, Goldsmith and Hennessey suggest that these members of
Congress did so only because of their understanding that the powers
would be employed largely by “career public servants” within agencies
that “are remarkably immune from inappropriate presidential
meddling.”226 But while deference to expertise may be reassuring,
particularly in highly technical areas or in times of high political drama,
this ability to push hard decisions to apolitical actors may also give
Congress a means of abdicating its own responsibility to promote
informed and public debate.
Of course, none of this necessarily means that bureaucratic actors can
easily thwart the will of political leadership.227 A President or other
political actor determined to act will often manage to do so if willing to
accept the political consequences, including not only the consequences of
the policy itself, but also of being seen to thwart her own advisors or the
career bureaucracy. And congressional administration of decision making
inside the executive branch is not a holistic solution to presidential
mismanaging of foreign relations. A President who is willing to face the
consequences of doing so can generally force the executive branch to
bend to her will. With respect to those officials who hold high-level
positions in the executive branch, like heads of departments and White
House staffers, the President may appoint whom she chooses, and she
may order officials beneath her to take, or not take, certain actions. 228 As
I discuss above, those who decide they cannot follow his orders typically
resign.229 Or the President may remove recalcitrant officials who refuse
her directions.230
There are some process answers to the above problems. If political
actors interfere with decision making in a way that upends congressional
faith in the internal processes they created, members of Congress may
226

Id.
See, e.g., Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance, supra note 52, at 214.
228 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
229 See Resignation Letter from James Mattis, Sec’y of Def., to President Donald Trump
(Dec. 20, 2018), https://media.defense.gov/2018/Dec/20/2002075156/-1/-1/1/letter-fromsecretary-james-n-mattis.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8PZ-XJBF].
230 See, e.g., Evan Perez & Jeremy Diamond, Trump Fires Acting AG After She Declines
to Defend Travel Ban, CNN (Jan. 31, 2017, 2:37 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/30/politics/donald-trump-immigration-order-department-of-justice/index.html [https://perma.cc/H2WY-HSTW] (discussing the firing of acting Attorney General Sally Yates); see also
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626–32 (1935) (describing executive
removal power).
227
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turn to different process controls, for example, by directly requiring the
involvement of very specific actors—such as with the proposed DETER
Act.231
Ultimately, the final constraints on the President’s abuse of
congressional controls lie outside the executive branch. They are
political—such as outcry at the firing of officials who insist on following
congressional requirements against the President’s will—and, to a lesser
extent, judicial—to the extent the administration refuses to engage a
reviewable statutory requirement. Both of these remedies require the
other branches to step up and engage more directly. Thus, to the extent
congressional administration pacifies Congress’s need to act and keeps it
from engaging further, this is a real threat to oversight of the executive
branch.
3. Overeager and Unwilling Deciders
Much deliberation over how to structure government rests on
assumptions that the players are power seeking.232 And Congress’s ability
to shift power dynamics inside the executive branch creates avenues for
internal actors to, in effect, lobby Congress to give them greater decisionmaking authority. Executive officials working with Congress to push a
legislative agenda is itself normal process; much legislation is the result
of congressional-executive wrangling, and executive branch officials
regularly seek legislation and work with counterparts in Congress to
accomplish it.233 A request for changes in decision-making authority—
versus substantive policy—may be based in genuine consideration of the
best allocation of expertise and resources. It may also, however, be
deployed by internal actors who simply want greater power to gain a leg
up in interagency conflicts through outside assistance from Congress.
But not all designations of deciders are the result of requests for more
power, and not all power is desired. Many executive officials may not

231 Defending Elections from Threats by Establishing Redlines Act of 2019, S. 1060, 116th
Cong. § 101 (2019).
232 See, e.g., William A. Niskanen, Jr., Bureaucracy and Representative Government 38–40
(1971) (arguing that bureaucrats seek to maximize their power, e.g., through their budgets).
233 See, e.g., 1988 BRAC Report, supra note 132, at 6–9 (discussing efforts by executive
branch officials to seek legislative relief from the base closure stalemate); The President’s
Private Sector Survey on Cost Control: Report on the Office of the Secretary of Defense 103
(1983) (proposing a nonpartisan commission to address base closures).
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always appreciate an allocation of power in their direction.234 A
designation of decision-making authority, even if crafted as one of simple
“fact-finding,” may put the designee in quite an awkward position vis-àvis her boss, the President, or other officials.235 Particularly executive
branch actors who view their roles as engaging in fact finding and
analysis, rather than policy making, may view a process control that
places their approval as the fulcrum for a decision as forcing them to act
outside of their ordinary mandate.236
That executive branch officials may not always seek or want policymaking authority runs counter to the orthodoxy that government officials
seek to aggrandize power; but so too does Congress’s slow abdication of
power over time to the executive branch, contrary to the Madisonian ideal
of the separate branches as checking one another through their clashing
hungers for power.237 And yet here we are. Government actors do not
always find that more responsibility, or more power, is necessarily in their
self-interest.238 Whether imposing on these officials despite their
reticence is in the public interest, however, is another question. In at least
some of these cases, it is worth considering that officials given roles that
they deem to fall outside of their mandate, expertise, or competence may
actually be right about their mandate, expertise, or competence (or at least
234

See, e.g., James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They
Do It 179–95 (1989) (countering the theory that agencies are “imperialistic” with evidence
that often they do not seek or even seek to avoid increases in budget or power).
235 Several Defense Secretaries responsible for certifying the Guantanamo transfers have
discussed the awkward position this placed them in: required by law to make a public
certification for which they would bear responsibility and yet facing a President who had made
Guantanamo closure a signature promise. See, e.g., Department of Defense Authorization for
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2012 and the Future Years Defense Program: Hearing on S.
1253 Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs. Part 1, 112th Cong. 49 (2011) (statement of
Robert Gates, Sec’y of Def.) (testifying that the congressional certification requirements had
put him in an “uncomfortable position of having to certify people who get returned”); Bruck,
supra note 100 (quoting former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel discussing the “immense
pressure” he felt from the President, as against the sentiment in DOD that there should be an
extremely high bar to release).
236 Intelligence analysts, in particular, view the role of their offices as providing information
and analysis and often seek to avoid a suggestion that they might be crafting policy. This
makes the proposal in the DETER Act, which would make a major policy decision—here a
sanctions regime—turn on the word of an intelligence agency—here ODNI—unusual. See
Defending Elections from Threats by Establishing Redlines Act of 2019, S. 1060, 116th Cong.
§§ 101, 202 (2019).
237 The Federalist No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“Ambition
must be made to counteract ambition.”).
238 Levinson & Pildes, supra note 160, at 2315.
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the latter two, as the first will inevitably shift with the new responsibility).
Designations of such officials under such circumstances could follow
from a breakdown in process or a lack of viable alternatives—such as a
widespread mistrust of the other available officials or of the President—
in which case Congress might be better suited to making the decision
itself than delegating it to the executive branch at all.
4. Surreptitious Interference with Political Will
Presidents, much more so than members of Congress, campaign on
foreign policy promises. And there is an expectation on the part of the
public that they will seek to carry out those promises. Congressional
administration may at times permit Congress to stymie presidential
prerogatives without necessarily doing so openly and entailing the
political cost of directly challenging the President’s stated policies
through substantive legislation. For example, President Obama
campaigned on closing the military detention facilities at Guantanamo
Bay.239 Once he began the process of doing so in office, congressional
opposition to the plan swelled.240 Yet rather than directly legislate that
Guantanamo be kept open or prohibit transfers entirely—and accept the
political heat or credit for doing so—Congress chose to influence the
course of Guantanamo closure through less transparent means, by altering
the transfer decision-making process. By so doing, Congress was able to
play a large role in upending the President’s closure agenda, for which he
might have reasonably argued he had a public mandate to accomplish.241
Because he, and not Congress, bore the brunt of that failed campaign
promise, members of Congress who opposed the President politically had
political incentives to upset his policies generally, regardless of their
belief in the ideal policy outcome, and particularly so if they could do so
with few political costs. In the case of Guantanamo, at least some of the
members of Congress who supported the process controls would surely
239 Barack Obama, The War We Need to Win (Aug. 1, 2007), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/08/the_war_we_need_to_win.html [https://perma.cc/744MUJQ8].
240 Charlie Savage, Closing Guantánamo Fades as a Priority, N.Y. Times (June 25, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/26/us/politics/26gitmo.html [https://perma.cc/QF88-MACZ].
241 Manners-Weber, supra note 166, at 1424. (“On the date President Obama signed the first
NDAA containing a certification requirement . . . there were eighty-nine men waiting on the
recommended-for-transfer list. For nearly three years, not one would be approved for
transfer.”).
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have supported more significant substantive measures as well, but it is
impossible to know whether there would have been any political costs
borne in that alternative universe. And because the costs to supporting
process controls are so low, congressional administration could
potentially lead to substantive results that neither the President nor
members of Congress who vote for the control measures would support—
or would want to be seen supporting—if required to do so directly.
5. Risks to Accountability and Transparency
Finally, and to my view most significantly, congressional influence
through process controls in lieu of direct substantive engagement with
policy can at times weaken, rather than augment, accountability and
transparency in foreign policy decision making. In fact, the very same
political advantages that members of Congress may seek in deploying
indirect mechanisms of influence rather than more direct forms of policy
making come hand-in-hand with concomitant disadvantages to
transparency and accountability. The extent to which a given control
weakens or strengthens accountability and transparency of decision
making depends on the particular control at issue, how it functions, and
the plausible alternatives against which it might be measured.
Arguably, the Constitution allocates to Congress certain powers, such
as the power to declare war, or to regulate international commerce, at least
in part because the Framers wanted certain types of decisions to be made
within the context of public debate, by the branch most closely
accountable to the public.242 Yet in contrast to the substantive control by
Congress of the merits of a particular policy objective, congressional
attempts to influence policy by manipulating the inner workings of the
executive branch, and specifically by designating as the decision makers
its politically insulated bureaucrats, entail significantly less transparency
or direct accountability for the substantive positions taken. This is not to
say that Congress itself is somehow legislating in secret; its enactment of
legislative process controls itself is as transparent as would be substantive
legislation. But it is the subsequent process of substantive decision
making by actors inside the executive branch that may become more
shielded from public view or voters’ control. In fact, that lack of political
accountability is often the point: whether out of a belief that the decision
is better made by technocrats without partisan political influence, or
242

U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 1–3, 8.
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because members of Congress want to shield themselves from political
costs, or both, Congress often deploys process controls in lieu of
substance specifically because it sets the substantive decision apart from
political accountability.243
The extent to which a given process control engages more or less
accountability, however, depends on the nature of the control itself and
on the baseline against which it is judged. Process controls may be
deployed specifically to raise a decision from the ranks of unknown
bureaucratic actors to a designated high-level official. Such was the case
with the Guantanamo certification requirements, in which case
Congress’s choice of process control took the decision-making authority
over transfers from an unnamed panel of bureaucrats who issued
determinations as a group and handed it to a not-overjoyed Secretary of
Defense for his personal sign off.244 In comparison to members of
Congress or the President, the unelected Secretary of Defense is less
accountable and certainly does not face the voters’ wrath directly unless
he later decides to run for elected office. But as compared to decision
making by a group of faceless bureaucrats, there is more personal
accountability in a decision made by a named high-level official such as
the Secretary of Defense. The many accounts by former Secretaries of
Defense who reported finding these requirements to be a significant,
painful burden supports the intuition that the direct designation of a
decision maker does create a sense of accountability for one’s
decisions.245 And yet, as I discuss above, as a matter of political
accountability, this process control allowed members of Congress to
hinder a public promise upon which the elected President had
campaigned, with little to no political risk themselves in doing so.
There are two stages at which accountability may be measured: the
point of legislating the process control and the point of substantive
decision making. As this example demonstrates, at stage one, process
243

See, e.g., supra Subsection II.C.3 (discussing military base closures).
See supra Subsection II.C.1.
245 See, e.g., Manners-Weber, supra note 166, at 1428 (“By localizing accountability in a
single person, certification requirements concentrate risk in that person. Personal
responsibility brings personal vulnerability. Moreover, these certifications must be
memorialized in writing, heightening the vulnerability: should things go wrong, there is a clear
record both of the certifier’s responsibility and of her poor judgment. This vulnerability
changes the certifier’s overall decision-making calculus; under the right set of factors, the
decisionmaker may become unwilling to make a decision that she would have made
otherwise.” (footnote omitted)).
244
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controls permit members of Congress to influence substance with less
political accountability than they would risk for substantive legislation,
though this can be mitigated to some degree by awareness about the
effects of these controls.
For the second stage, the specific function the process control
implements and the baseline against which it operates are both critical
factors in determining the extent to which a given process control aids or
weakens accountability for specific officials inside the executive branch.
But weighing congressional administration against more direct
substantive congressional engagement is not necessarily a fair
comparison. An alternative universe in which Congress legislates
substance up to the extent of its formal authorities might be one in which
foreign policy is more accountable to public opinion (putting aside for the
moment whether that would be a normatively desirable outcome). But
considering Congress’s historical trajectory at this point, it is not a
realistic one.246 Therefore, while it is wise to compare the accountability
effect of different types of process controls as against one another, it is
not generally realistic to compare them to direct substantive congressional
engagement.
Counterintuitively, the duly elected President is not necessarily a more
accountable “designated decider” than a specific named official in his
cabinet. While designating the President as decider might formally appear
to place the reins in more publicly accountable hands, the functional
reality is that the President-as-designee does not effectuate the same
personal accountability features that would any-other-named-official-asdesignee. This is so for several reasons, among them the fact that the
President will be held vaguely accountable for all decisions emanating
from his term in office, whether within or not within his control, and the
sheer enormity may tend to swallow up any given decision.247 But more
importantly for our purposes, presidential decisions and pronouncements
246

See supra Part I.
See “The Buck Stops Here” Desk Sign, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library &
Museum,
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/buckstop.htm
[https://perma.cc/33LQ-5H8X]
(discussing President Truman’s oft-stated motto, “the buck stops here,” meaning “the
President—whoever he is—has to decide. He can’t pass the buck to anybody”). But cf.
Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One Departure, White House (Jan. 10, 2019),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-onedeparture-30/ [https://perma.cc/3G3S-MXUE] (President Trump stating, “[T]he buck stops
with everybody” in response to the question: “Does the buck stop with you over this
shutdown?”).
247
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are often the result of processes that take place far below his radar, via
group decision making by unnamed officials, whom the President and her
subordinates will often designate and task secretly.248 Thus, neither direct
congressional engagement with substance nor direct decisions by the
President are, as a realistic matter, necessarily more “accountable”
options against which to measure congressional administration. Instead,
specific process controls, decision-making processes, and their distinct
implications must be weighed against each other and against a realistic
assessment of the plausible alternatives.
CONCLUSION
Congressional administration of executive branch decision making
provides a means for Congress to move past the impasses that often hinder
direct congressional action in the foreign affairs and national security
spaces. The process controls I analyze in this Article permit members of
Congress to advance policy preferences, push back against a President
whose policies they mistrust, or resolve politically fraught quandaries by
placing them in the hands of experts, without many of the policy and
political risks that often get in the way of substantive legislation. And yet,
despite their salience, the influence of process controls on the foreign
policy and national security decision-making process is often absent from
debates about the allocation of these powers between the President and
Congress.
The use of process controls to designate deciders within the executive
branch is particularly effective when it exploits known tensions, which
provide opportunities for Congress to influence policies through strategic
use of pressure points on the internal decisional process. Congress—and
the courts, as I will discuss in a future paper—might deploy this
mechanism of oversight even more instrumentally as a means of playing
a more significant role in national security and foreign relations without
necessarily infringing on the executive’s comparative advantages of
speed, expertise, and knowledge, or undermining the United States’ “one
voice” in foreign affairs.
Process controls are not a panacea, and they are not without risk.
Indirect influence through legislation of process is not always superior to
direct substantive legislation, and the existence of this half measure may
248 Even when the President creates processes publicly through, e.g., executive order, the
specific officials are often unnamed. See Exec. Order No. 13,567, 3 C.F.R. § 3 (2011).
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at times prevent Congress from taking more direct action. Moreover,
process controls entail certain risks—to efficient decision making, to
accountability, and to public engagement with foreign affairs and national
security decisions. Choosing the proper control requires consideration of
context, purpose, and the state of play inside the executive branch.
Nevertheless, process controls offer three critical advantages to direct
substantive legislation. First, they provide a means for members of
Congress to influence policy without necessarily incurring the political
costs that often keep them from engaging. Thus, to the extent
congressional involvement is important, process controls may often be
the only game in town. Second, process controls may be more effective
than direct mandating of policy, as they act through the commandeering
of officials inside the executive branch, often before decisions even reach
the President, rather than through direct interbranch conflict, which the
President may be more inclined to thwart. And finally, process controls
provide a means of congressional influence on policy while still
benefiting from the executive branch advantages of information,
expertise, and dispatch. Ultimately, process controls can be an important
tool Congress may and should deploy to push back against the President,
giving that branch some concrete means to complement the President’s
creeping claims to unilateral power in the foreign affairs and national
security spheres.

